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Chapter 1-Introduction
Ideas and the construction of ideas matter. However, these ideas and process must be
contextualized and understood analytically. Ideas include norms, identity, culture, and
values. I analyze Hezbollah’s role as a norm entrepreneur in the Middle East. Since
World War II the term “Middle East has slipped into popular use […], and though there
remains divergences over its extension, both as whether it should be narrower, to exclude
African Arab States west of Egypt, or broader to include (among others) the Muslim
republics of Central Asia,” a compromise definition is usually favoured.”1 Despite the
plurality of claims, I have adopted Fawcett’s version of the Middle East which is
understood to include the Arab countries of West Asia and North Africa, members of the
Arab League, Iran, Turkey and Israel. Despite no geographical closeness, Fawcett
maintains that the Middle East “possesses certain distinctive ‘systemic’ properties and
unifying characteristics.”2 The question driving my research is: how does Hezbollah
function as a norm entrepreneur in the Middle East? More specifically, how does
Hezbollah create the norm of resistance?
I argue that Hezbollah functions as a norm entrepreneur by constructing and
physically manifesting ideas. Material resistance as a norm is created through
institutionalized ideas, such as the concept of jihad, martyrdom, the oppressed/oppressor
dichotomy, and anti-imperialism. Hezbollah is continuously constructing the norm of
resistance while the party itself is the physical expression of resistance. Ideas are then
operationalized and performed. What Hezbollah is resisting is the political order of the
Louise Fawcett, International Relations of the Middle East, (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2005), 2.
2
Fawcett, 2.
1
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world. It is variously categorized as a movement that is anti-globalization, antiimperialist, anti-Western, and more importantly anti-Zionist.3 Resistance, as constructed
by Hezbollah, is the necessary means to challenge the global order and this is believed to
be achieved through struggle. Opposition or resistance to the status quo, as defined by the
status quo powers (the West, the Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC] states, and Israel), is
rejected and does not include the instrument of violence as a legitimate means for change.
Therefore, the approach Hezbollah utilizes is not welcomed, and virtually from its
inception the “Party of God” has been strictly policed. The most obvious example of this
policing was the US State Department’s 1997 inclusion of Hezbollah on its list of
“foreign terrorist organizations.”4

Theory
Social constructivism fills the analytical gap left by neorealism and neoliberalism by
accentuating identity, norms, and the social construction of anarchy in global politics.
Materialism is assumed by neorealists and neoliberals to take precedence over ideas.
Material factors include war, gold, tanks, warships, military prowess, oil, bombs, and
economic superiority.5 Constructivism, however, adopts social theory as an approach to
global politics. Social theory stresses politics, economics, history, culture, and institutions

Dominique Avon and Anais Khatchadourian, trans. Jane Marie Todd,
Hezbollah: a History of the Party of God (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 2012), 134.
4
Avon and Khatchadourian, 3.
5
Alexander Wendt (a), “Constructing International Politics,” International Security 20,
no. 1 (1995): 4.
3
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that are assumed to be humanly defined not naturally defined.6 Constructivism holds that
the world is socially constructed, composed of thoughts, beliefs, interpretations, and
presentations. A state’s interpretation or perception of what constitutes a threat will differ
from one state’s interpretation or perception to another’s. In essence, ideas are what
construct the social world and global politics, and not material factors. Thus, from a
constructivist viewpoint the world is built by human consciousness.7 Consequently,
constructivism suggests that the world can change and is not handicapped by a natural
anarchy or fear of war. The exchanges of ideas and interactions among agents allows for
the world to be continuously under construction.8 Agents of construction may include
states, sub-state groups, non-governmental organizations, international organizations, and
transnational organizations.
Constructivism shares with neorealism the assumption that states are the
principal unit of analysis. However, constructivism attempts to understand the behaviour
of states by highlighting identity, norms, and institutions. Neorealists assert that states
have only one identity which is self-interest. Moreover, neorealists maintain that states
are interested in power politics. Constructivism counters by arguing that state identities
and interests are constructed by social structures.9 Also, identities and interests are
endogenous to the international system and are developed through interaction. Equally
important, state identities and interests change over time. That is, identities and interests
are socially constructed and not fixed. In addition, an agent may have multiple identities
Robert H. Jackson and Georg Sorensen, Introduction to International Relations:
Theories and Approaches, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 209.
7
Jackson and Sorensen, 209.
8
Jackson and Sorensen, 209.
9
Alexander Wendt (b), “Collective Identity Formation and the International
State,” The American Political Science Review 88, no. 2 (1994): 385.
6
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at one time such as being democratic and capitalist, with Islam being the official state
religion. Constructivists contend that small states such as Nepal, for example, would not
be interested in power politics or self-help. Furthermore, relationships among states
mature and are mutually constituted through meanings, interests, and norms.
Subsequently, if identity and norms are analytically neglected then interaction and
“exercises of power, or actions,” amongst states are rendered meaningless.10 Thus, in the
world constructed of anarchy, identity becomes imperative in state relations. As Wendt
lucidly puts it: “an anarchy of friends differs from one of enemies.”11 Therefore, it is
important to know and understand the identity of the Other.12 In a nutshell, not all states
share the same interests or have the same identity and “it would be extraordinarily
wasteful to treat every state as though it posed the same potential threat or offered the
same potential opportunities.”13
The construction of norms are another significant strength of constructivism.
Norms expressed in international institutions help to define, socialize, and persuade states
to behave in a particular manner.14 The norm of sovereignty has been constructed and
reconstructed throughout history. Sovereignty is the notion that states are independent
and equal. There are internalized norms of behaviour, such as the norm of non-

Ted Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,”
International Security 23, no. 1: 173.
11
Wendt (a), 78.
12
Paul A. Kowart, “The Peril and Promise of Constructivist Theory,” Ritsumeikan
Journal of International Studies 13, no.3: 159.
13
Kowart, 159.
14
Ian Hurd (a), “Constructivism,” The Oxford Handbook of International
Relations, edited by Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal, 1-19. (Oxford:
Oxford UP, 2008), 304.
10
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interventionism.15 The construction of supreme power or legitimacy over a state’s borders
was challenged following Rwanda’s genocide in 1994. This is understood to be the norm
emergence of the responsibility to protect. The supreme authority of the state over its
borders is challenged if the state is incapable of protecting its citizens. Sovereignty is
challenged in the event of real or suggested genocide or mass atrocities.16 It is the
responsibility of the international community to intervene to protect those in danger,
effectively violating the norm of sovereignty. Sovereignty has become redefined and no
longer provides immunity from intervention. The norm of responsibility to protect was
internalized in 2005. 17 Neorealists do not recognize changes in state attitudes or
behaviour and neoliberals explain changes in behaviour through the virtue of cooperation.
Norms are not part of their individual ontology. Finnemore argues that identity and
interests are explained by “international forces,” or by the norms of behaviour entrenched
in “international society.”18 The norms of international society are communicated to
states through international organizations. Norms shape “national policies by ‘teaching’
states what their interests should be.”19
I deploy social constructivism because it allows me to see Hezbollah from a
unique perspective, otherwise not possible from a neorealist or neoliberal standpoint.
“Anarchy is what States Make of it” is the title of Alexander Wendt’s seminal work on

Alain De Benoist, trans., “What is Sovereignty?,” Telos, no. 116: 100.
“Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide,” United Nations,
accessed December 20, 2015,
http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/responsibility.shtml.
17
“Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide.”
18
Jackson and Sorensen, 218.
19
Jackson and Sorensen, 218.
15
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the essential pillar of neorealism, anarchy.20 Neorealists argue that anarchy is the same
for all actors, that is, that there is no central authority above the state. Kenneth Waltz
adds that actors must resort to self-help to fend off potential threats.21 Wendt agrees with
Waltz claim, but asserts that anarchy is socially constructed. Moreover, if actors have
multiple identities not all states can be perceived or constructed as threats. By extension,
having multiple identities means that different actors will have different understandings
of one another.22 Effectively, having different understandings means that states will
interact differently with one another. Wendt, for example, states that “500 British nuclear
weapons are less threatening to the United States than 5 North Korean nuclear weapons,
because the British are friends of the United States and the North Koreans are not, and
amity or enmity is a function of shared understandings.”23 This illustration is reflective of
the example stated above that an anarchy of friends differs tremendously from an anarchy
of enemies. This is due to identity which is constructed through interactions. The
constructed understanding the United States has of Great Britain is one of friendship, but
with North Korea one of enmity. Despite the smaller amount of nuclear warheads North
Korea has compared to Great Britain, the United States would find the North Koreans far
more threatening. Who a state is or the norm it identifies with is critical in global politics.
Moreover, Hopf argues that the implementation of trade agreements, for instance, “where
actors do not worry much about the potential costs of ceding control over outcomes” to
other actors or institutions, illustrates “a realm of world politics where neorealist ideas of

Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction
of Power Politics,” International Organization 46, no.2 (1992): 391-425.
21
Jackson and Sorensen, 174.
22
Jackson and Sorensen, 174.
23
Wendt, 73.
20
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anarchy are just imaginary.”24 Therefore, social constructivism provides a distinct
opportunity to study Hezbollah as a norm entrepreneur. It allows me to study Hezbollah
using social ontology employed by constructivism. This is in contrast to neorealism’s and
neoliberal’s individual ontology. More specifically, utilizing social constructivism allows
me to analyze norms, ideas, values, and identities ignored by neorealist and neoliberal
analyses. Constructivism allows me to study sub-state groups and other non-state actors
in global politics which are ignored by neorealists. Stated simply, neorealism is unable to
study Hezbollah. Neorealism’s principal unit of analysis is the state.25 Non-state actors
such as Hezbollah are effectively exempted from neorealist analysis. Neoliberalism’s
approach does not allow me to study Hezbollah as a norm entrepreneur, as neoliberalism
does not recognize the social construction of norms in global politics. My novel
contribution to the research already conducted on Hezbollah is to study the non-state
actor as an agent of norm construction.

Norm Entrepreneurship
Norms are defined as values that outline the proper way for agents with a given identity
to behave. Norms are intimately involved with identity and identity formation, as they
standardize behaviour using rules.26 For example, liberal democracies are associated with
promoting and protecting human rights. The protection of human rights has become an
Hopf, 174.
John J. Mearsheimer (a), “Structural Realism.” In International Relations
Theories: Discipline and Diversity, edited by Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki , and
Steve Smith, 77-94. 3rd Ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 79.
26
Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and
Political Change,” International Organization 52, no. 4: 891.
24

25
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integral element to any state that claims the identity of liberal democracy. A state cannot
claim to be democratic without respecting or advocating human rights. This is an
example of identity and norms being mutually constituted and how norms outline the
proper way in which states or agents should behave. If states do not follow a particular
norm such as human rights while adopting an identity such as being democratic then they
run the risk of being ostracized by the international society.
According to Finnemore and Sikkink, there is a typology of norms, including
regulative and constitutive. Regulative norms regulate existing norms or rules. The World
Trade Organization, for example, serves to regulate trade among states. By effectively
regulating rules on trade, the World Trade Organization is regulating state relations and
behaviour.27 Constitutive norms, on the other hand, refer to the formation of actors,
interests or categories of action.28 The instance of sovereignty as a norm regulates state
practices, but these very rules are what constitute a sovereign state. Constitutive norms
give meaning to regulative norms and are mutually constituted.29 Norms are not made in
a vacuum, Finnemore and Sikkink argue, but “emerge in a highly contested normative
space where they must compete with other norms.”30 Norms are propagated by what are
known as norm entrepreneurs.
Norm entrepreneurs are critical for norm creation. “Norm entrepreneurs are
critical for norm emergence because they call attention to issues or even “create” issues
Michael N. Barnett, “Social Constructivism” in The Globalization of World
Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, edited by John Baylis, Steve
Smith, and Patricia Owens, 150-164. 5th Ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011),
152.
28
Finnemore and Sikkink, 891.
29
Barnett, 152-3.
30
Finnemore and Sikkink, 897.
27
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by using language that names, interprets, and dramatizes them.”31 Norm entrepreneurs are
convinced that an existing norm is inappropriate and in need of a change. Again, the
norm of sovereignty offers an elucidating example. Following the atrocities in the mid1990s, such as the Rwandan genocide, a new norm, known as the responsibility to
protect, was constructed.32 According to this norm, while states remain the sole authority
within their borders once they violate fundamental norms such as human rights or begin
to commit atrocities such as genocide or ethnic cleansing against their own citizenry, then
the international community has a responsibility to intervene, consequently violating the
norm of sovereignty.33 Norm entrepreneurs are driven by empathy, altruism, and
ideational commitment. Many states may adopt a norm for political reasons and to
enhance their domestic legitimacy. Empathy is the notion of feeling for others. This
interconnectedness leads actors to care for the well-being of others even if it does not
entail any benefits for the entrepreneur. Altruism is benefiting the other at the expense of
oneself. The core of altruism lies in the notion that all people, as human beings, have
rights and share common characteristics. Ideational commitment is the belief in the ideals
of the new norm, even if the new norm under construction entails no effect on the
entrepreneur. However, Finnemore and Sikkink are quick to remind that many norm
entrepreneurs do not necessarily “act against their interests,” but rather act in “accordance
with a redefined understanding of their interests.”34 For example, de jure sovereign states
had to be convinced that the authority they have been enjoying may be revoked if they
violate the rights of their citizenry. Likewise, the International Red Cross had to persuade
Finnemore and Sikkink, 897.
Barnett,163.
33
Jackson and Sorensen, 149.
34
Finnemore and Sikkink, 898.
31

32
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military leaders that protecting the injured during war, for example, was in line with their
war aims.35
Norms have what Finnemore and Sikkink call a lifecycle. The life cycle has
three stages. The first stage is norm emergence and is often led by organizations or
epistemic communities. To replace an existing norm with an alternative, norm
entrepreneurs are required to have an organizational platform to persuade policy-makers
that the current norm is outdated and no longer appropriate.36 A platform may already be
in existence, such as a media outlet.37 Equally important, is that occasionally norm
entrepreneurs may have to act inappropriately to gain the attention of decision-makers to
enact a new norm. Examples of such inappropriate behaviour include civil disobedience,
refusal to pay taxes, hunger strikes, and vandalism of government property to gain the
attention or interests of policy-makers. The Civil Rights Movement and the fight for
international suffrage exhibited civil disobedience.38 There is no precise timeline for
norm emergence, as some new norms may take several years to reach the “tipping point.”
A norm may either successfully continue to the next stage of the norm lifecycle (ascend)
reaching the tipping point or fail to reach the second stage of the lifecycle (descend).
Empirically, the authors contend that if enough critical states and one-third of all states
adopt the new norm, then it will likely reach the norm cascade, or stage two of the norm
lifecycle.39 Critical states are not Western countries or the advanced economies of the

Finnemore and Sikkink 899.
Finnemore and Sikkink, 899.
37
Finnemore and Sikkink, 896.
38
Finnemore and Sikkink, 897.
39
Finnemore and Sikkink, 901.
35
36
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world per se, but countries that have stakes in a new norm being created. For instance, the
norm of sovereignty affects all states recognized as sovereign but not all equally.
Norm cascade is the second stage of the norm lifecycle. This is the moment
when agents are compelled to adopt the new norm because of an agent’s legitimacy,
reputation, and/or esteem. In this stage, states begin adopting the norm swiftly through
“socialization” by NGOs, states, and other organizational platforms. The pressure to
adopt the new norm is sufficient, as most states prefer to be norm followers and a part of
the so-called “international community” rather than norm breakers. For example, a liberal
democratic state will be inclined to adopt a norm relating to human rights which would
further increase its legitimacy, reputation, and esteem. The norm cascade moment is
intertwined with a state’s identity. Slightly before stage three in the norm lifecycle, the
peer-pressure on decision-makers and the naming and shaming through socialization40 “to
make the right choice” becomes so detrimental that the identity and behaviour of noncompliant states is questioned. The cascading norm must be adopted to re-legitimatize
and protect a state’s identity and esteem if it is to remain a member in good standing of
the international society.41
The final stage in the norm lifecycle is internalization. Professionals,
bureaucracies, and international law integrate the norm, subsequently making the norm
habitual and institutionalized. Following the norm cascade stage, the new norm is
adopted without much thought or objection. Consequently, it becomes internalized.
Sovereignty, human rights, and the responsibility to protect are examples of internalized

40
41

Finnemore and Sikkink, 902-3.
Finnemore and Sikkink, 903-4.
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norms that have been socially constructed and institutionalized.42 These norms, among
others, have been launched by entrepreneurs and/or professionals, who, through
persuasion and socialization, have successfully updated an existing norm.
Which norms matter is important to the process of norm construction. States or
non-state actors will be more willing to adopt a new norm when their domestic legitimacy
is under scrutiny. Furthermore, some norms are more successful than others due to
prominence. “Norms held by states widely viewed as successful and desirable models are
thus likely to become prominent and diffuse”43 because of the image and power of these
agents. For example, human rights, sovereignty, and the responsibility to protect are all
norms valued by the West and have become institutionalized by the allure of the United
States and other Western states. Norms that have intrinsic qualities are also likely to be
successful. Keck and Sikkink argue that intrinsic norms are cross-cutting and affect all
states. Norms relating to human dignity common to most cultures or issues aiming to
protect minority groups from bodily harm or women’s suffrage are examples of intrinsic
norms.44 More specifically, an example of an intrinsic norm is the effects of smoking and
secondhand smoke. Exposing the vulnerable or innocent bystanders to secondhand smoke
is intrinsic in nature because it poses a serious health risk to any citizen, irrespective of
his or her culture. When the apparent dangers associated with secondhand smoking
became widely known this helped to propel an intrinsic norm against the habit of
smoking.45 Next, adjacent or norms succeeding older norms are also likely to succeed.
Norm entrepreneurs work tirelessly to conjoin their issues with prevailing norms and
Finnemore and Sikkink, 904-5.
Finnemore and Sikkink, 906.
44
Finnemore and Sikkink, 906-7.
45
Finnemore and Sikkink, 907.
42
43
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emergent norms.46 Lastly, world time may help norms advance. Following wars, shocks,
or depressions, Sikkink and Finnemore suggest, states begin to seek new norms. New
norms may replace existing norms adhered to by the losing side of a war. An example of
world time would be the conclusion of the Cold War and Russia’s adoption of neoliberal
policies. Following the collapse of state communism in Eastern Europe, the disintegration
of the Soviet Union, and consequently the end of the Cold War, Russia adopted
neoliberal policies, including privatization and currency devaluation. Many became rich
overnight, while many more were severely impoverished. This example of the
disintegration of the Soviet Union illustrates how a country reacts to a shock, such as the
economic collapse of the Soviet Union and then proceeds to accept emerging norms, such
as neoliberal economics.47 Due to the processes of globalization, new norms are now
moving through the three stages of norm entrepreneurship quicker than before,
accelerating the lifecycle.48 The process of norm construction, with its lifecycle, agents,
motives and mechanisms, is represented in Table 1.1.
Stage 1

Tipping Point

Stage 2

Stage 3

Norm Cycle

Norm Emergence

Norm ‘Cascade’

Internalization

Actors

Norm entrepreneurs w/
organizational platforms

States, Intl organizations,
networks

Law, Professionals,
bureaucracy

Motives

Altruism, empathy,
ideational commitment

Legitimacy, reputation,
esteem

Dominant Mechanisms

Persuasion

Socialization,
Institutionalization,
demonstration

Conformity (conform to
the international
community)
Habit, institutionalization

Table1.1: Three Essential Stages of Norm Entrepreneurship.
Finnemore and Sikkink, 908.
Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism, (New York:
Metropolitan /Henry Holt, 2007), 564 and 585.
48
Finnemore and Sikkink, 909.
46
47
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Source: Martha Finnemore and Katheryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and
Political Change,” International Organization 52, no. 4: 896.
Social constructivism allows for analysis of interactive processes among
agents. It forces global politics not to be understood as given, but rather as an ongoing
construction of norms, ideas, culture, values, and identity. Constructivism’s social
ontology allows us to better understand reality or rather helps us to place meaning to
something. Constructivism allows for the world to be seen as a project continuously
under construction. By extension, the norm of resistance and the neorealist assumption of
anarchy are socially constructed. Constructivism’s approach to global politics is unique.
Through the social construction of ideas, meanings, and norms, I analyze
Hezbollah as a norm entrepreneur. Constructivism provides a critical and dynamic
account of Hezbollah and this analysis is a valuable supplement to the spartan corpus of
constructivist studies of Hezbollah. Constructivist analysis allows me to study Hezbollah
as a norm entrepreneur, socially constructing the norm of resistance.

Concepts and definitions. The concepts of Hezbollah’s ideology, including resistance,
legitimacy, and infitah, require definition. Charles Tripp avers that resistance is implied
in a relation of power. Where power is, resistance must also be present. However, both
resistance and power share an inverse relationship, whereby those in power reject those
who resist. Power, like resistance, is a relation between political actors. Similar to
diachronic shifts in ideology, this relationship also changes, moulded by the shifting
context of political activity and by the need for power.49 An example of such a shift in
49

Charles Tripp, The power and the people: paths of resistance in the Middle
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context was in a speech presented by Hezbollah’s Secretary-General, Sayyed Hassan
Nasrallah, in 2011, in which he extolled Hezbollah and the Syrian army, but condemned
the uprisings against the Ba’athist government.50 The norm of resistance is the
contestation of space, material and discursive. That is, resistance takes on ideas,
meanings, messages, and themes, but is also materially expressed on the battlefield where
a resistance movement, such as Hezbollah, is needed to obtain the “material conditions
for contesting the power structure in a given space.”51 Resistance is also an action that
requires the construction of an organizational platform, such as Hezbollah’s TV network,
Al-Manar. Resistance is a struggle aimed at achieving change against domination.52
According to Hezbollah, resistance is a struggle against the social construction of
oppression, humiliation, and occupation of Arab and Muslim lands. Today, it is a struggle
against neo-colonialism and the Zionist project, including its usurpation of Arab lands
and water. Resistance is integral to Hezbollah’s identity. The Party of God’s principal
party organ is its military wing. A former Hezbollah activist explains how critical
resistance is: “‘Resistance is like a one-wheel[ed] bike that [Hezbollah] is riding. If it
stops pedaling, it falls’.”53
Ian Hurd defines legitimacy as the normative belief of an agent that a rule or
institution must be obeyed. Legitimacy is subjective and relational between the actor and

East, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 6.
Tripp, 8.
51
Walid El Houri, “The Meaning of Resistance and Hezbollah’s Media Strategies and the
Articulation of a People,” (PhD diss., University of Amsterdam, 2012), 49.
52
El Houri, 49 and 50.
53
Emile El-Hokayem, “Hizballah and Syria: Outgrowing the Proxy Relationship,”
The Washington Quarterly 30, no.2: 44.
50
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the institution. It is construed by the actor’s perception of the institution.54 The actor’s
perception may be derived from the process by which the rule was established. The
actor’s perception affects behaviour because it is adopted by the actor and helps to define
how the actor sees its interests.55 In a nutshell, legitimacy is the widespread belief that the
actions of an agent are desirable, decent, or apt within a “‘socially constructed system of
norms, values, beliefs, and definitions’.”56 Indeed, a lack of legitimacy is costly to any
organization which requires discipline, devotion, and political support, such as
Hezbollah. Those in power require legitimacy to validate their rule.57 Without legitimacy,
authority is met with greater resistance. Furthermore, in the absence of legitimacy, norm
construction becomes a difficult task. For an emerging norm to become acceptable, such
as resistance, it must be exercised or manifested by an agent that is perceived to be
legitimate. The identity and legitimacy of a norm entrepreneur is intimately connected to
the norms it wishes to construct. The construction of being perceived as legitimate is
important to those in power and/or seeking to construct new norms. Hezbollah has
achieved legitimacy through elections and through its policies of infitah and
Lebanonization. The Party of God understands that the construction of legitimacy cannot
be confined to its local constituency in the south, but rather must extend to all Lebanese,
regardless of sectarian identity. It constructs itself as a resistance movement that is
resistant to the corruption and nepotism that have plagued Lebanon for years.

Ian Hurd(b), “Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics,” International
Organization 53, no. 2 (1999): 381
55
Hurd (b), 381.
56
Mark Suchman qtd. in Hurd (b), 387.
57
Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom qtd. in Hurd (b), 388.
54
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Hezbollah enacted infitah as a policy in 1991. Hezbollah adopted infitah as a part
of its commitment to pragmatism and its willingness to “open up” and become a
mainstream political party. This was in contrast to the party’s previous position of being
clandestine. Infitah is a harmonization between Hezbollah’s Islamic identity and its
Lebanese nationality. It is an expression of the idea that it is possible to resist oppression
beyond the confines of Lebanon (regional and global dimensions) and be concerned with
national-patriotic issues (domestic dimension).58 Through infitah, Hezbollah is fighting
for social equality and justice for all across both dimensions.59 Hezbollah also adopted
Lebanonization in 1991 and it refers to a political tactic whereby Hezbollah analyzes the
prevailing circumstances in Lebanon and constructs its approach within that context,
making exceptions for Lebanon’s specific circumstances, sympathetic to the country’s
confessional differences, and its perception of its environment.60 Lebanonization refers to
the recognition or awareness that Hezbollah is a Lebanese organization, composed of
Lebanese rank and file, its leader is Lebanese, and the Party of God is ultimately
committed to the welfare of Lebanon. Hezbollah adopted Infitah and Lebanonization
prior to the 1992 municipal elections in an effort to gain votes, notably from the
Christian, and Sunni communities. The Party of God “employs the concept infitah or
Lebanonisation to denote its political discourse, deeds, […] or to signify its enrolment in
Lebanese domestic political life.”61

Joseph Alagha (a), The Shifts in Hezbollah’s Ideology: Religious, ideology,
Political Ideology, and Political Program, (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University
Press 2002), 170.
59
Alagha (a), 170.
60
Alagha (a), 169.
61
Alagha (a), 169-70.
58
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Hezbollah’s policies of Infitah and Lebanonization are critical in understanding its
changing normative ideas. Without understanding infitah and Lebanonization, it would be
difficult to analyze how Hezbollah has reconstructed itself from a clandestine movement
to a mainstream political party. Hezbollah’s changing normative ideas and norm
construction can only be explained through the processes of infitah and Lebanonization.
It is through the realization of infitah and Lebanonization that Hezbollah is able to
continuously reconstruct itself as a legitimate resistance movement and not a militia.
Hezbollah’s norms are not constructed in a vacuum. Hezbollah is entrepreneuring
these norms in a context given to it by history. The social construction of jihad,
martyrdom, oppressed/oppressor dichotomy, and anti-imperialism are not new ideas, but
rather have been reconstructed over time. Jihad and martyrdom were constructed as
integral ideas since the 7th century. Furthermore, they are not ideas exclusive to Islam, but
are also entrenched in Jewish and Christian tradition. Regarding imperialism, Hezbollah
is part of a larger continuum of resistance movements from the Middle East and the
Muslim world who have challenged imperialism. Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood,
Nasserism or Arab nationalism, Algeria’s National Liberation Front (FLN), the Irish
Republic Army (IRA), the Vietcong, Abu Nidal Organization (ANO), the Palestinian
Liberation Organization (PLO), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP),
the Kurdish Workers Party (the PKK), and HAMAS are all examples of movements
across the world who have challenged imperialism either through jihad and martyrdom or
through conventional warfare. The oppressed/oppressor dichotomy has also been
constructed throughout history by several movements, including The Civil Rights
Movement, the Women’s Movements for International Suffrage, South Africa’s African
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National Congress (ANC), the Red Army Faction, the Tamil Tigers, and the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia People's Army (FARC).

Project Organization

My project is organized into five chapters. In this introductory chapter I have posed my
research question, articulated my thesis and reviewed the tenets of my analytical
framework. In chapter two, I review the extant literature studying Hezbollah according to
its theoretical foundation. This enables me to identify and address the lacuna in the
corpus. In chapter three, I examine the ideas that are critical to Hezbollah and the
normative shifts the Party of God has experienced over the years. More specifically, I
examine jihad, martyrdom, the dichotomy of the oppressed versus the oppressor, and
anti-imperialism. For example, I examine Hezbollah’s dedication to jihad not only as a
method of armed struggle, but also as an inner struggle for the cause of humankind. In
chapter four, I discuss the physical expression of ideas. I survey Hezbollah’s battle with
Israel in 2006 and the current Syrian civil war to show that the 2006 war was a form of
norm contestation, designed to strip the Resistance of its weapons and finally eradicate
the Party of God. In response to Israel’s construction of Hezbollah as a terrorist
organization bent on murdering all Jews, Hezbollah uses the term terrorist as a rhetorical
bludgeon to describe Israel. Terrorism or labelling the Other as “terrorist” is an
expression of power. The idea that both agents accuse the other of terrorism is a form of
norm contestation that manifested itself in 2006. The fact that Hezbollah is able to accuse
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Israel of terrorism attests to the party’s political power in Lebanon and in the region. In
the case of the Syrian war, Hezbollah has constructed the conflict as a battle between the
resistance bloc, including Al Assad, and the status quo powers. In contradictory fashion,
Hezbollah’s involvement has only jeopardized Hezbollah’s norm construction and has
alienated the party from its Sunni allies, such as HAMAS. I conclude by identifying some
further research trajectories in chapter five.
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Chapter 2-Literature Review
The literature on Hezbollah is large and growing. There a number of ways to organize the
corpus. I have used the theories of neorealism, neoliberalism, and constructivism to
categorize the literature. A succinct definition of each theory is given. All sources
reviewed fall within the confines of neorealism, neoliberalism, or social constructivism.
None of the literature I reviewed used post-structuralism or Marxism, and consequently,
they were not one of the theories presented here. Neorealism’s ontology does not
recognize non-state actors and Hezbollah is a non-state actor, so only one source
reviewed used neorealism. Neoliberalism is the dominant theory used to analyze
Hezbollah. The majority of the sources reviewed have adopted a neoliberal approach.
One of the advantages neoliberalism has over neorealism is that it recognizes non-state
actors and institutions as significant actors in global politics. In addition, it is broad and
encompassing and challenges neorealism’s exclusivist analysis of the state and is able to
produce a wide array of analyses that emphasize an inclusive framework. This allows
neoliberalism to be dynamic when compared to neorealism and able to identify and
examine many aspects of global politics, including Hezbollah. Social constructivism also
recognizes non-state actors, but largely focuses on the (re)construction of ideas, norms,
and identity; elements that have been ignored in neoliberal analyses of Hezbollah. My
study of the Party of God fills the lacuna left by neorealists and neoliberals by examining
Hezbollah as a norm entrepreneur. Sources are divided based upon themes, including
ideas, identity and religion, martyrdom operations and jihad. Personal memoirs or
interviews with Deputy Secretary-General Sayyed Naim Qassem and Secretary-General
Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, a comprehensive analysis of the Shi’a organization, the
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significance of Imam Hussein’s martyrdom, and Hezbollah’s role in Syria are also
presented.

Neorealism
Neorealism is parsimoniously associated with power and the distribution of power.
Neorealism is a rational choice theory. Rational choice theory is an approach that
emphasizes how actors seek to maximize their interests and how they choose the most
effective way to achieve those interests.62 Rational choice theorists disregard norms,
beliefs, values, and identity. In the realist and neorealist sense, power is material and
tangible. Material power may include tanks and people. Neorealism adopts positivism as
its principal epistemology. A scientific approach to the study of International Relations,
positivism posits that knowledge of the social and political “dimensions” may be
objectively studied and this knowledge may be acquired through empiricism. Those who
advocate positivism see no difference between social sciences and natural sciences.63
Neorealism’s ontology is individualist and materialist.64 That is, it is the material
capabilities, such as war, gold, tanks, warships, and military prowess, inter alia, that are
important in global politics. Thus, neorealism disregards ideas and holistic structures.
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Realism maintains that it is the individual who desires power due to human nature.65 That
is, states, whether democratic or autocratic, are led by individuals who have an innate
desire to dominate. Neorealism differs in this sense. Neorealism enjoins that it is not
human nature that drives policy-makers to seek power, but the structure of the
international system.66 It is not hierarchy, however, that produces war, but anarchy.
Anarchy is the notion that there is no government or international governing body above
the level of the state.67 As there is no proper disciplinary institution in place to ensure
peace, states are left to settle disputes through other means, including war. Consequently,
wars become a reality of global politics. Therefore, states must help themselves and must
pursue power as a mechanism of survival. Mearsheimer accurately summarizes
neorealism’s notion of anarchy and power: states “are trapped in an iron cage where they
have little choice but to compete with each other for power if they hope to survive.”68
Survival is the goal of every state and this is ultimately achieved by obtaining as much
power as possible. Neorealism acknowledges states as the only significant actors of
consequence in global politics. As a result, the theory is not widely used to study
Hezbollah.
The author, Trita Parsi, briefly mentions the skyjacking of TWA Flight 847 and
goes into further detail about the reaction of the Central Intelligence Agency and
Iranian’s former president Hashemi Rafsanjani. Parsi also explores the Lebanese-Israeli
conflict in 2006 and how Iran uses its support for proxies as leverage when negotiating
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with the United States. Finally, Parsi devotes a paragraph to explaining Hezbollah’s
attack on U.S Marine barracks in 1983 which killed 241 servicemen.69
Parsi focuses on foreign policy between the states of Israel, Iran, and the United
States. His text excludes the domestic politics of each state from its analysis. Treacherous
Alliance is useful because it provides a thorough history of foreign relations between the
three states. He asserts that the enmity between all three states is not due to Iran
becoming the first theocratic state in the modern Middle East in 1979, but rather due to a
“shift in the balance of power in the Middle East after the end of the Cold War and the
defeat of Iraq in the first Persian Gulf War.”70 The text’s exclusive focus on foreign
policy, dedicating a section to the “unipolar era,” and use of the balance of power as a
heuristic device belies its neorealism. Again, the historical relationship between the three
states proves useful when exploring Iran’s contemporary relationship with the United
States and Israel. Alas, Parsi fails to capture the importance of Hezbollah in the region.
The author cannot analyze Iran and Hezbollah as a part of the resistance bloc. Parsi
cannot recognize Hezbollah’s efforts as a norm entrepreneur because of neorealism’s
exclusivist focus on state actors. Also, because neorealists do not see the importance of
norms and non-state actors in global politics which is evident in Parsi’s shallow analysis
presented on the Party of God. The author’s choice to use neorealism only handicaps the
author’s ability to adequately examine a non-state actor such as Hezbollah and Iran’s role
in the so-called treacherous alliance.
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Neoliberalism
Like neorealism, neoliberalism is a rational theory in International Relations.
Neoliberalism emphasizes individualism and freedom as core values. Neoliberalism
considers states to be unitary and rational. Unitary states are centralized governments
with central authority. Rational states are states that are motivated by calculating the costs
and benefits associated with any given decision.71 Neoliberalism maintains that
cooperation is possible because states are rational. In addition to being rational, states
seek to maximize their absolute gains through the value of cooperation. States are able to
see the value in cooperation. By extension, states are not concerned about the gains of
other states. Thus, global politics becomes less competitive. Cooperation is handicapped
by states who do not wish to cooperate and by cheating states.72 Issue-areas that are
perceived to be beneficial to all states are where cooperation is most likely. For instance,
the environment and trade are areas of common cooperation. Cooperation is manifested
in institutions, trade, and complex interdependence. Complex interdependence refers to
the interconnectedness of the world attributed to world trade and globalization.73 States
being interdependent on one another mitigates against war.74 Regarding democracy,
Immanuel Kant posited the idea of democratization or democratic peace theory,
suggesting that democratic states share common values and norms, and therefore, are less
likely to be predisposed to violence or war with other democracies. Dyadic peace theory
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contends that democracy is inherently more peaceful than autocracy. Therefore, it is
assumed, if all states are democratic then virtually no wars will occur.75 This is because
democratic leaders are responsible to their constituents and no responsible citizen would
vote for an unjust war. Neoliberalism is synonymous with fanatical free market
economics, free trade and deregulation.76 It is performed by the Bretton Woods
institutions (the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank), the United States, and
is synonymous with globalization.77 Like its counterpart, neorealism and other rational
choice theories, neoliberalism adopts positivism as its epistemological underpinning. Its
ontology, like neorealism, is also individualist and materialist, devoid of ideas or social
structures. The neoliberal project began in Augusto Pinochet’s Chile in 1973 and would
later be advanced by former Prime Minister of U.K., Margaret Thatcher and former US
President Ronald Reagan.78 In all, neoliberalism is the economic side of liberalism and is
facilitated by the state. Neoliberalism is the preferred theoretical framework for analysis
of Hezbollah.
In Syria and Iran: Middle Powers in a Penetrated Regional System the authors
emphasize cooperation and democratization as common themes. Ehteshami and
Hinnebusch use Keohane’s and Nye’s complex interdependence to help explain Syria and
Iran’s foreign policies and the nature of their alliance, especially in Lebanon regarding
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the historical formation of Hezbollah.79 The authors argue that Syria and Iran help to
counterbalance pro-Western states in the Middle East and US hegemony in the region,
especially following Saddam Hussein’s defeat in the Gulf War. They may have opposing
interests at times, but the authors consider Syria and Iran “middle powers” who seek to
dominate the geopolitical order “in the name of defending regional autonomy.”80
Ehteshami and Hinnebusch’s study on Syria and Iran is pertinent to my study, but it
struggles to explain Iran and Syria’s historical relationship. The authors cannot explain
why both states have opposing interests at times while other times they have similar
interests. Constructivism explains that interests are continuously under construction, and
consequently, change over time. Ehteshami and Hinnebusch’s emphasis on cooperation
and complex interdependence falls short of understanding the reconstruction process of
identity and interests. By not examining the reconstruction of interests, the authors cannot
explain why interests change.
In Syria, Iran, and Hezbollah: The Unholy Alliance and Its War on Lebanon,
Deeb gives a neoliberal assessment of the adverse effects Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah have
allegedly had on Lebanon. The text focuses on more recent events, depicting Lebanon as
a satellite state to the much larger Syria and Iran. Hezbollah’s role is to function as a
client of both Syria and Iran and serve as a means to maintain influence in Lebanon. The
author argues that neither Syria nor Hezbollah favoured any peace accord between
Lebanon and Israel, but rather “delayed the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon” for years.81
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Furthermore, Deeb repeatedly mentions “freedom” as a common theme throughout the
book, citing “freedom” for the Cedar Revolution and “freedom and human dignity.”82
Individualism and freedom are two of the core values of neoliberalism.83 The author
inaccurately describes the premise of the “unholy alliance” as one that is founded on
religious commonality. Deeb uses the term “unholy” to describe the alliance, highlighting
the group’s apparent religious unity. Constructivism, however, provides a unique
explanation of the “unholy” alliance that fills the lacuna left by Deeb. Using
constructivism, I argue that it is not Shi’ism which unites the “unholy alliance,” but rather
the norm of resistance. Deeb’s theory of the “unholy” alliance cannot, for example,
explain why HAMAS is also considered a close ally of Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah,
despite HAMAS being the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, a Sunni social
and political movement. The author does not recognize the importance of norms in global
politics, and as a consequence, provides a narrow examination of the so-called unholy
alliance.
Similarly, Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism by Danial Byman
attempts to explain the connections between sub-state terrorist groups and their state
sponsors. His principle research question is: why do states support terrorist groups?
Byman argues that states fund or aid terror groups out of perceived necessity to preserve
national security interests. According to Byman, the aim of mobilizing a terrorist group is
to destabilize a neighbouring country, remove enemy regimes, counter American
unipolarity, or to achieve other goals.84 In addition, it is cheaper to arm and train a
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terrorist group to wage covert operations against another state, for instance, than to arm
and train a state’s military forces.85 Byman assigns a chapter to covering the historical
relationship between Iran and Hezbollah, characterizing their “deadly connection” as
“strong” in contrast to weak, lukewarm, passive, antagonistic or unwilling.86 He claims
that Hezbollah is under the tutelage of the Islamic Republic, although in his conclusion
he does admit that after serving Iran well, Hezbollah has “retained a degree of
independence from Tehran.”87 Byman discusses the potential adverse effects economic
sanctions may have on a state that aids terrorists, directly or indirectly. As a rationalist, he
argues that states calculate the costs and benefits of having sanctions in place. Byman
suggests states may back down when they see economic losses due to sanctions, such as a
drop in tourism and that vulnerability (whether the state could “replace the lost trade or
investment”) would be one of the principle concerns of any state.88 A historical analysis
of Iran and Hezbollah’s relationship is given which provides useful information regarding
their alliance, including why Iran has supported Hezbollah in the past and why it
continues to do so today. Byman’s text does not recognize norms as an important element
in Iran and Hezbollah’s relationship. The norm of resistance is an important, if not, the
most important element in their alliance. By not analyzing norms, Byman provides a
superficial examination of Iranian support for Hezbollah. What unites Iran, Syria, and
Hezbollah is more than religious commonality and/or “terrorism,” but norms that are
continuously under construction. This cannot be understood using a neoliberal
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framework. I fill the lacuna left by Byman, Deeb, Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, among
others, by analyzing Hezbollah as a norm entrepreneur.
Cordesman’s “Iran’s Support of the Hezbollah in Lebanon” seeks to disprove
that Hezbollah is being fully supported by Iran.89 Cordesman, writing during Hezbollah’s
war with Israel in the summer of 2006, argues that Hezbollah is not entirely reliant on
Iran or its Revolutionary Guard Corps, but still receives weapon shipments from the
Islamic Republic, such as short-range and long-range missiles.90 Cordesman urges
American commentators to not make haphazard claims about Iran’s role in the 2006 war
before seeing any factual evidence.91 Cordesman sees Hezbollah, Syria, and Iran as
rational actors who cooperate within an alliance or a resistance bloc. The author describes
how Hezbollah, Syria, and Iran had regular meetings, including one with HAMAS’
Khaled Mashal shortly before Hezbollah kidnapped two Israeli soldiers which ultimately
led to the 2006 war with Israel,92 implying that the four had devised a plan to kidnap the
Israeli soldiers. Actors that are rational and able to cooperate with one another in a world
of anarchy is one of the principles of neoliberalism.93 Indeed, constructivists maintain
that states are rational actors, but that anarchy is socially constructed. Notably, states and
state interests are also socially constructed. The value of Cordesman’s work lies in his
offering a fresh perspective that is uncommon in neoliberal discourse; that is, he does not
reduce Hezbollah to a proxy of Iran. The notion that Hezbollah is not reducible to Iran is
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a radical shift in direction, and as a result, uniquely helpful to my study. Cordesman
explains how Iran supports Hezbollah and argues that both are equal in their relationship.
However, Cordesman does not explain what unifies Iran and Hezbollah. The lacuna left
by Cordesman is answered by analyzing the norms, identity, and interests of Iran and
Hezbollah which are in line with one another. Both construct themselves as anti-Zionist,
anti-imperial, and resistant to the status quo powers. The author explains the reasons for
Israel going to war with Hezbollah by providing a tautology of events, including
Hezbollah’s mission where resistance fighters kidnapped two Israeli soldiers which
eventually led to the outbreak of the 2006 war. By using constructivism, I am able to
provide an alternative analysis of the 2006 war by arguing that the war was a contestation
of norms with the intended goal of dismantling Hezbollah and stripping it of its weapons
supply.
Similarly, background on Hezbollah’s relationship with Syria is explored in
“Hizballah and Syria: Outgrowing the Proxy Relationship.” A neoliberal work, ElHokayem gives a historical review of the relationship between the two parties, beginning
with Hafez Al Assad’s time in office to Bashar Al Assad’s tenure as president. ElHokayem states that Hezbollah is still viewed by many analysts such as Deeb as a
“proxy” or “client” of Iran and Syria. El-Hokayem holds that the Shi’a revival as a
political entity in the Lebanese polity and across the Middle East, and Hezbollah’s
military victory over Israel in 2006 has provided the Shi’a movement with autonomy by
expanding its support base throughout Lebanon.94 In fact, the author goes as far as to
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assert that claiming Hezbollah to be a client of either state is an “obsolete” practice.95 ElHokayem explains that it is not Hezbollah that is dependent upon Syria, but rather the
opposite.96 Nevertheless, Hezbollah and Syria have historically been a part of an alliance
against the Israeli occupation of south Lebanon, the Golan Heights, and later the Shebaa
Farms. According to El-Hokayem, Hezbollah and Syria have become dependent upon
one another and this was illustrated in 2006 when Hezbollah defended itself against
Israeli aggression with the help of Syrian support.97 In exchange, Syria was seeking to
regain its position in the region and give Al Assad’s government a “new lease on life.”98
The author explains how peace and cooperation may be realized by having common
objectives or preferences causing both parties, Syria and Hezbollah, to be interdependent
upon one another, despite anarchy. The article was selected as it provides an insightful
look into Hezbollah’s historical relationship with the Assad government constructed
throughout the years. The article was written prior to the current Syrian conflict, but it is
important to understand the historical relationship that draws these two allies together.
Once clear, one begins to see Hezbollah’s involvement in the current Syrian crisis as
more of a desperate measure in rescuing the resistance alliance, than a conflict for
religious supremacy. El-Hokayem states that identity is important in global politics, but
does not expound upon it.99 The author avers that Bashar Al Assad relied on Nasrallah to
help cultivate his identity as a capable leader. Al Assad did so in order to challenge
presumptions that he was too young to lead Syria. However, the author does not explain

El-Hokayem, 35.
El-Hokayem, 36.
97
El-Hokayem, 35.
98
El-Hokayem, 35.
99
El-Hokayem, 42.
95
96

Elbenhawy 34

why Al Assad has continued to be an ally of Hezbollah and Iran. I fill the lacuna left by
El-Hokayem by using social constructivism. By using constructivist analysis, I explain
the nature of Syria’s relationship with Iran and Hezbollah by examining the role of norms
in the resistance bloc.
Voice of Hezbollah: the Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah is comprised
of speeches and interviews from the mid-1980s to 2007 conducted mostly with the
Secretary-General of Hezbollah, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah. The interviews were partly
conducted in English and Arabic. In addition, sources used were translated from Arabic
to English. The book shares the views of the leader of Hezbollah on several topics
ranging from the Arab-Israeli conflict and the “War on Terror,” to Iran’s nuclear
ambitions.100 The Voice of Hezbollah is more than a mundane autobiography of the
Secretary-General. It is one of the few dependable sources available in English to
“compare and/or criticize the ideas expressed directly by Hezbollah’s leader.”101 Features
of neoliberalism often emphasized by Nasrallah in the text include freedoms, capital, and
economics.102 Moreover, the concept of cooperation is a common theme throughout the
book. Nasrallah discusses cooperation as a favourable alternative to conflict concerning
the several factions in the Lebanese government. Neoliberalism sees peaceful coexistence
as a possible solution to anarchy mainly through institutions and complex
interdependence.103 The text uses complex interdependence to explain Hezbollah’s
position on cooperation in the Lebanese government, but fails to adequately explain that
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it is identity that has created a schism in the government, namely between the March 8
Alliance and the Cedar Revolution. The Cedar Revolution has historically mistrusted
Hezbollah and its allies, claiming that the pan-Shi’a party is a client of Iran. Hezbollah’s
implementation of Lebanonization has done little to change this perception, especially
following the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq al Hariri.
Similar to Nasrallah, Hizbullah: The Story from Within provides its readers with
an intimate account of the dynamics of Hezbollah in a thematic sequence ranging from
the group’s goals and vision to essential milestones in the group’s history, the Palestinian
cause, regional and global politics with Iran and Syria, and lastly the future of Hezbollah
as a non-state actor. A neoliberal text, Qassem reaffirms the importance of Islamism to
the pan-Shi’a movement and argues that occupation of land is sinful, and therefore, must
be resisted.104 Moreover, the author praises Iran for its unrelenting support by stating
“upon its foundation, Hizbullah saw a possibility for achieving its goals and aspirations
through the backing and reinforcement expressed by Iran.”105 Qassem provides a
neoliberal perspective of Hezbollah. This is in contrast to my analysis of Hezbollah,
which allows me to study the movement as a norm entrepreneur, including its ideas,
norms, and physical resistance. Qassem does not examine the importance of norms in
global politics or Hezbollah’s norm entrepreneurship. Hizbullah: The Story from Within
was chosen in preference to other works, because it offers a fresh perspective from one of
the leading members of the movement.
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Norton is known for his seminal book, Hezbollah: A Short History. This text is an
encompassing neoliberal analysis of Hezbollah, ranging from its early beginnings to its
war with Israel in 2006. The author’s aim is to provide a more “balanced and nuanced
account” of Hezbollah.106 Norton posits that Hezbollah and other Lebanese movements
may have participated in lethal violence against the Israeli Defense Forces, but were
within their legal limits to do so, as long as Israeli forces occupied swathes of southern
Lebanon.107 Norton argues that the movement’s ideas have become contradictory. That is,
there is clash between Hezbollah’s religiosity and pragmatism. However, in my study I
argue that Hezbollah’s ideas do not clash, but are congruent. Similar to identity
construction, constructivism holds that ideas are continuously being (re)constructed.
Thus, ideational changes can be explained from a constructivist perspective as dynamic
shifts that have been (re)constructed in an effort to adapt and pragmatize. Indeed, this is
what Hezbollah does.
A neoliberal text exploring Al-Manar TV, “Aiming at Liberation: Al-Manar
Media Campaigns against the Israeli Occupation of Southern Lebanon (1998–2000)”
argues “that Hezbollah decided to use the media systematically, as one of the tools to
achieve the liberation of southern Lebanon from Israeli occupation” realized in May
2000.108 For example, propaganda, including infomercials and messages, such as “‘why
wait until June to leave Lebanon,’”109 were promulgated and employed as means to
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demoralize Israeli soldiers stationed in south Lebanon. The messages resonated loudly
and were able to reach viewers as far as Haifa, Israel. Harb examines the role of AlManar TV in Lebanon from 1996 until 2000. Harb provides a chronicle of events leading
up to May 2000, citing Al-Manar’s role in psychological warfare. However, the author is
unable to analyze Al-Manar TV as an organizational platform for the party’s norm
lifecycle. The author explains how the transmission of ideas are imperative to the overall
success of Hezbollah. Having an organizational platform such as a TV network is an
indispensable tool to any norm entrepreneur. I use Harb’s insights to explore Hezbollah’s
campaign of psychological warfare.
Bringing matters into the contemporary moment, Sullivan analyzes
Hezbollah’s military engagement in the Syrian conflict using a neoliberal framework.
“Hezbollah in Syria” provides detailed information about the role of Hezbollah, Iran, and
Iraqi militias in Syria’s civil war. Major offensives led by Hezbollah, in conjunction with
the Syrian army and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps against opposition forces,
are featured. The author concludes that the ‘Axis of Resistance” has actually benefited, at
least militarily, from fighting side-by-side. Equally important, the article illustrates how
Hezbollah has impacted the outcome of the war and tipped the balance back in the favour
of Al Assad after he seemingly lost his grip on power. Iran and Hezbollah contributed to
the war effort by training Syrian troops and paramilitary groups supporting Al Assad,
through reconnaissance missions in Al Qusayr, Al Qalamoun Mountains, Halab,110
Homs, Hama, and Damascus.111 Indeed, the Syrian conflict has proved to be the litmus
test for Syria and its allies and the outcome, according to Sullivan, has favoured
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Hezbollah, Iran, and Syria. The conflict has strengthened them. For example, the conflict
has provided the opportunity for Iranian and Hezbollah fighters to gain valuable
experience on the battlefield and allowed others, namely the Shias of Iraq, to join in the
fight in Syria.112 Again, cooperation is the common theme in “Hezbollah in Syria.” In
fact, Sullivan argues that cooperation was and remains critical for Al Assad government
to remain in power. Also, Sullivan discusses the relationship between Hezbollah and
Syria and how strong it is.113 Despite the presence of anarchy, cooperation is feasible.
This particular conceptualization of cooperation is one of the core principles of
neoliberalism.114 Hezbollah is not authoring the norm of resistance alone, but,
unsurprisingly, in conjunction with state agents such as Syria and Iran.
In sum, neorealism views states as paramount, excluding the role of non-state
actors in global politics. As a result, little has been written on Hezbollah from a neorealist
perspective. Indeed, the majority of the literature already written on Hezbollah is
theoretically neoliberal, leaving a lacuna to be filled. I fill this lacuna by analyzing
Hezbollah as a norm entrepreneur in the Middle East. In contrast to neorealism and
neoliberalism’s individual ontology, social constructivism is based in a social ontology
and emphasizes the role of norm construction in global politics. This allows for a unique
and valuable addition to the corpus of literature already produced on Hezbollah.
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Constructivism
Constructivists are concerned “with the centrality of ideas and human consciousness,”
while emphasizing “a holistic and idealist view of structures.”115 Idealism holds that ideas
are important in international politics. Structures, according to social constructivists, are
social and not entirely material.116 Constructivists are concerned about whether or not the
structure is what constructs the agent’s ideas, interests, norms, and identity or if agents
are born with predetermined identities and norms. This suggests that agents are presocial. This is known as the agent-structure problem.117 In contrast to individualist and
materialist ontology (neorealism and neoliberalism), constructivism subscribes to a social
ontology. Constructivists recognize materialism as a part of their ontology and enjoin that
the world is composed of materialist and social structures. That is, the material world can
only be understood through intersubjective meanings.118 As social beings, agents (states
or individuals) cannot be detached from a world of normative meaning that constructs
who they are and the possibilities open to them.119 Identity and interests also cannot be
detached from a world of social meaning. Thus, identities shape interests. Interests are
socially constructed and therefore change over time.120
Constructivists adopt an intersubjective understanding of state relations,
emphasizing ideas, social agents, structures, norms, and the mutual constitution of
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identity. 121 It refers to social interactions among states which are constantly under
construction. For example, cooperation and enmity between states is not given, but
constructed through intersubjective meanings and interactions.
Norms and the roles they play in global politics as social constructs are also an
important element in constructivism. Constructivism’s epistemology is post-positivist.122
A response to positivism, post-positivism is a methodology which rejects the application
of the natural sciences to the social sciences. Post-positivist methodology rests on the
idea that people “conceive, construct, and constitute the worlds in which they live,
including the international world, which is an entirely human arrangement and nothing
else.”123
Hezbollah’s norm of resistance has been reconstructed over time. This reflects the
dynamic political landscape of Lebanon. Joseph Alagha discusses these changes in great
detail. While other works recognize that Hezbollah is a pragmatic political and social
movement, Alagha differs because he analyzes diachronically the group’s fundamental
ideas. In his dissertation, The Shifts in Hezbollah’s Ideology: Religious ideology, Political
Ideology, and Political Program Alagha examines Hezbollah’s political and religious
ideology and divides Hezbollah’s ideological and political shifts into three stages: 1)
1978-1984/5, 2) 1984/5-1990, and 3) 1991-2005 respectively.124 Jihad, martyrdom, the
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oppressed/oppressor dichotomy, anti-imperialism, and relations with the West and
Europe are explored as ideas and practices.125 Alagha enjoins that the movement has
favoured a pragmatic political program, especially after the 1992 parliamentary elections
in response to Hezbollah’s ever-changing environment. Alagha’s dissertation enhances
my study of Hezbollah by providing fresh constructivist insights into the party’s identity
and ideological shifts.126 Plenty of studies on the Party of God provide an analysis of the
ideas and practices of Hezbollah, but do not do so diachronically. The ideas Hezbollah
constructs have changed.
Another text by Alagha, “Israeli-Hizbullah 34-Day War: Causes and
Consequences,” explores the reality of indiscriminate warfare, including Israeli use of
weapons such as white phosphorus and cluster bombs.127 The author’s thesis is that
Hezbollah’s resistance has shifted and is no longer directed at Israel, but after 2006, has
become “Lebanonized” or internalized and more recently, has focused on the Syrian
crisis. Alagha lucidly explains the recent changes in Hezbollah’s norm of resistance.
Alagha also examines the political schism that occurred following Hezbollah’s “Divine
Victory” in the 2006 war with Israel. The schism was the consequence of Hezbollah’s
demand that “a national unity Cabinet be formed, where the party and its Christian allies,
the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), wield the one-third veto power.”128 In a deliberate
attempt to control the national political sphere, Hezbollah and its allies sought to exercise
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power over the legislature and the presidency.129 According to Alagha, the demand for a
one-third veto crystallized out of Hezbollah’s surge in popularity following Israel’s
failure to disarm and dismantle the group. The 2006 war with Israel signified a shift in
Hezbollah’s construction of resistance, from being regional to domestic. I deploy Alagha
to make the point that Hezbollah’s resistance shifts according to its political environment.
Alagha’s analysis of the 34 day war complements my study on Hezbollah’s material
resistance and illustrates how ideas of jihad and martyrdom are realized in war.
Hizbu’llah: Politics and Religion by Amal Saad-Ghorayeb is an indispensable
account of the ideology of Hezbollah, often referenced by other texts. Saad-Ghorayeb
explores inner and outer jihad as a concept which helps to provide discipline to
Hezbollah, the relationship Iran and Syria have with the group, and what it means to be
anti-Zionist. Most other books have similar reviews of the Shi’a movement, but SaadGhorayeb goes further and explains the dichotomy of oppressor versus the oppressed as
one of the central elements of Hezbollah’s ideology. It is the notion that the oppressed
must rebel, regardless of their religion, race, or creed to challenge the oppressors. The
oppressors are often described as the United States and Israel. An example of oppression
is the perception of the Zionist project which is Israel’s goal of occupying swathes of
land encompassing the Nile in Egypt to the Euphrates in Iraq.130 America’s role in the
project is that it seeks to subordinate the Middle East to its economic demands, usurping
the wealth of the Middle East, and stimulating instability in the region.131 SaadGhorayeb’s principle objective is to “examine the central pillars of Hizbu’llah’s
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intellectual structure within the framework of Lebanese socio-political reality.”132 SaadGhorayeb does not emphasize history as much as Hezbollah’s ideas that are continuously
under construction. Furthermore, the author examines Hezbollah’s “clash” in identity,
politically with “its Islamic principles” and how they contradict.133 Of course, identity
matters too.
Hamzeh’s In the Path of Hezbollah focuses heavily on the emergence, ideology,
organizational structure, and modes of action, and their implications for Lebanon and the
wider region.”134 Organizational structure refers to the hierarchy of Hezbollah. The
modes of action include militant (armed struggle) and the gradualist-pragmatic mode
(participating in politics and gaining more seats in the legislature) which Hamzeh argues
are not contradictory.135 The author goes into detail about the concept of jihad,
martyrdom operations, and the organizational structure of resistance. According to
Hamzeh, the book offers a mosaic of theories, including crisis conditions, revolutions,
leadership, personality, social class, and political parties.136 However, these are not
recognized “theories” in International Relations. Hamzeh’s analysis of Shi’a identity,
Shia “identity crisis,” and ideology are reflective of constructivism.137 Similarly to SaadGhorayeb’s Hizbu’llah: Politics and Religion, Hamzeh investigates issues that are at the
core of my study, including how ideas matter and how they are implemented. For
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instance, Hamzeh examines the juristical ideology of Hezbollah and how it has
transformed itself, ideologically, from militancy to pragmatism.138

Conclusion
My study analyzes Hezbollah in terms of the construction of global politics. Using the
notion of norm entrepreneurship developed by Finnemore and Sikkink, I fill the lacuna
left by other texts by examining Hezbollah from a constructivist standpoint. This is a
valuable addition to the literature already produced on the Party of God for several
reasons. First, I demonstrate the importance of constructed ideas and how ideas are
ultimately performed. Second, I illustrate that the meaning of resistance and what it
means to “resist” are not given, but constructed. Equally important, by using social
constructivism as my theoretical lens, I help the literature examine Hezbollah in a
fundamentally different way; that the norm of resistance is continuously under
construction, shifting and projecting new ways to resist. Third, I explain how ideas
change over time. Prior to 2006, the norm of resistance was directed entirely towards
Israel and the United States, but as I argue this is no longer the case. Due to the wars in
Syria and Yemen, Hezbollah has constructed new enemies, such as the GCC states, and
Sunni extremism. By seeing Hezbollah in this light, I argue that Hezbollah is creating a
pragmatic version of resistance that is serving its interests, nationally, regionally, and
internationally, effectively transforming its identity, transforming even the label of a
resistance movement to a successful political party.
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Chapter 3-Hezbollah’s Changing Normative Ideas
Finnemore and Sikkink state that in order for a norm entrepreneur to be successful an
organizational platform is required.139 It is the necessary infrastructure required by a
norm entrepreneur and is used as a launching pad in stage one of norm construction,
known as norm emergence. Without an organizational platform to promote or propagate
the emerging norm, the chance of the new norm reaching the “tipping point” decreases
significantly and it is unlikely to reach stage two of norm construction, known as norm
cascade. Accordingly, it is impossible to promote a new norm without a platform from
which to advocate. Ideas must be objectified through an organizational platform. Through
Al-Manar TV (literally means the Lighthouse), Hezbollah engaged in psychological
warfare. Psychological warfare refers to messages that are delivered through violent and
nonviolent methods. It was an alternative method of war in its fight for liberation from
Israeli occupation. As Al Jammal asserts, Israel has attempted and continues today to
portray Hezbollah as terrorists and thugs. He emphasizes the importance of changing
terminology from terrorist to fighter, for example, and for the world to be presented with
a more balanced representation of the party. This was only possible through an
organizational platform, such as Al-Manar TV.140 It is important to stress that norm
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entrepreneurship is reserved for those in positions of power. Not all norm entrepreneurs
possess or have access to an organizational platform. Consequently, certain norms do not
reach the “tipping point.” Having access to an organizational platform is an expression of
power. Hezbollah’s norm entrepreneurship attests to its empowerment as being part of
the Lebanese established order.
As a norm entrepreneur, Hezbollah has continued to construct and reconstruct the
norm of resistance through the use of its ideas. These ideas have been the ideological
pillars of the movement since its inception and remain integral to Hezbollah. These ideas
are jihad, martyrdom, the oppressed/oppressor dichotomy, and anti-imperialism. The
ideological foundation of Hezbollah has also shifted throughout its history in response to
Hezbollah’s environment. To adapt, Hezbollah had to alter the ideas mentioned above
that were developed and introduced during the late 1970s and mid-1980s when the
movement was still clandestine. This chapter explains Hezbollah’s ideological pillars and
illustrates how these normative ideas of resistance have been reconstructed over time. I
argue that as part of its commitment to infitah, Lebanonization, and pragmatism,
Hezbollah has had little choice but to adapt in order to survive the political climate in
Lebanon and remain armed. Remaining an armed movement is Hezbollah’s raison d’etre
if it wishes to continue constructing the norm of resistance. Even if the weapons remain
unused, the perception of having weaponry serves to further enhance the legitimacy of
Hezbollah as a symbol of resistance in the region, even if some doubt the legitimacy of
the claim.
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Jihad
Violence and Islamic extremism are commonly misunderstood to be exclusively
associated with jihad. However, jihad, originating from the Arabic verb jahada, means to
struggle, exert, strive, or endeavor.141 This does not necessarily refer to violence, but
rather to struggle in the way of God. Jihad is a dedication to one’s religiosity, either
through intention or action.142 The struggle may refer to any activity, be it internal or
external. According to Hezbollah, any action that exercises effort in God’s cause is
jihad.143 Furthermore, according to an Islamic scholar, the use of jihad in the Quran and
Hadith is enjoined for believers to struggle with their possessions and selves in the way
of God.144 This struggle is not necessarily for God, but in the cause of mankind.
Consequently, God’s cause is the “cause of the people, the oppressed, the cause of pride,
honour and glory, the cause of the defense of the land, the cause of the defense of the
sacred, of religion and of the values of humanity’.”145 In Hezbollah’s religious doctrine,
jihad is defensive rather than offensive.146 Defensive jihad is categorized by military and
non-military jihad. Military refers to jihad by the hand or battling the enemy on the
battlefield. Non-military jihad refers to persuasive jihad. Persuasive jihad is jihad
practiced by the tongue and heart.147 Jihad of the tongue is “supporting the right and
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correcting the wrong.”148 Jihad of the heart is combating the devil and worldly
temptations.149 Hezbollah is not religiously sanctioned to launch a preemptive attack on
its enemy (offensive jihad), reserving only the right to self-defense (defensive jihad).
Moreover, defensive jihad does not necessarily refer to martyrdom. For instance,
Hezbollah’s former Secretary-General Abbas Al-Mussawi was assassinated, along with
his wife and son by Israeli fire in 1991 and was consequently honoured as a martyr even
though he did not participate in military jihad.150 Chapter 9 of the Quran titled Al-Tawba
helps to construct jihad’s importance in Islam and those who devote themselves to the
cause (9:29): “Fight those who do not believe in Allah or in the Last Day and who do not
consider unlawful what Allah and His Messenger have made unlawful and who do not
adopt the religion of truth from those who were given the Scripture - [fight] until they
give the jizyah willingly while they are humbled.”151 Imam Ali Ibn Abu Taleb stated
“‘jihad is one of the doors of heaven, God opened it for his special saints. Jihad is the
garment of the pious; it is God’s shield and his assured Heaven’.”152 It is incumbent on
all Muslims, young or old, healthy or ill to engage in jihad.153 Quotations from the Holy
Quran, and statements from Imam Ali, help to (re)construct the idea of jihad as a struggle
that every Muslim must endure. Hezbollah constructs jihad as a struggle for God and not
Hezbollah. However, through Hezbollah one is able to serve his religion by striving for
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the sake and cause of God by fulfilling his duties of jihad. This is as an important starting
point for Hezbollah.
Hezbollah has adopted a broader definition of jihad categorizing what Hamzeh
labels major modes and submodes of jihad. Hezbollah has categorized the major modes
of jihad as Greater Jihad (al Jihad al-Akbar) and Lesser Jihad (al Jihad al-Asghar).
Greater Jihad refers to the inner struggle one faces throughout his or her lifetime.
Hezbollah’s Deputy Secretary-General Sheikh Naim Qassem explains Greater Jihad as:
‘“placing one’s powers and faculties under the yoke of Allah’s commands and purging
the domain of one’s body of satanic elements and their forces’.”154 Nasrallah emphasizes
that the ‘“battle with oneself is more dangerous than the battle with the external enemy.
Thus our struggle against ourselves must be stronger than our struggle with our
enemy’.”155 Notably, Greater Jihad is not a struggle that ends expeditiously, but rather
according to Hamzeh is an everlasting struggle.156 Further, Greater Jihad prepares the
believer for Lesser Jihad, that is, the armed or physical struggle. Following some battles,
the Prophet Muhammed avers: “‘We returned from the smaller jihad (al jihad al-asghar)
and we still have [to conduct] the greater jihad (al jihad al-akbar)’.”157 The Prophet
explained greater jihad as the “‘the struggle with the self (jihad al-nafs) [jihad of the
self]’.”158
Lesser Jihad or (al Jihad al-Asghar) refers to fighting the non-believers, or in the
case of Hezbollah, the imperialists and the oppressors. Lesser Jihad is divided into two
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submodes: Elementary (Offensive) and Defensive Jihad. Defensive Jihad is further
divided into armed and unarmed Jihad. Only the Prophet or one of the Twelve Imams159
may authorize elementary jihad, also known as “holy war” or “offensive war” according
to Hezbollah’s ideology.160 It is global in scale and is intended to spread Islam across the
world. Despite the presence of the faqih Ali Khamenei, elementary jihad cannot be
authorized. Accordingly, Qassem summarily concluded that the conditions warranted for
offensive jihad are clearly not available, and therefore, non-existential.161 The conditions
are unavailable because there is no living Prophet or Imam who can authorize elementary
jihad.
Defensive Jihad (al Jihad al-Difa’i) espouses defense as an essential mechanism
for resisting aggression from opponents of Islam who wish to harm the umma. Defensive
jihad, some argue, also includes defending the Muslim umma’s right to freely proselytize
the message of Islam. The umma is the symbolic representation of the total Muslim
population of the world. The umma transcends borders, ethnicities, and races. Many
Islamists hope for the umma to be a unitary political entity, ruled by a caliphate. Anarchy
being socially constructed and an integral element of global politics, Hezbollah considers
Defensive Jihad as the only means of defending the umma from unwarranted attacks.
This is also an attempt to internalize the norm of resistance. Notably, Hezbollah’s cadres
do not need the authorization of an infallible Imam to engage in Defensive Jihad in
contrast to Elementary Jihad. Permission to engage in Defensive Jihad is granted by the
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waliyat al-faqih, the Supreme Leader Sayyed Ali Khamenei.162 According to Shi’a
tradition, defensive military jihad is a religious obligation in the following three
circumstances:
1.) If the opponents of Islam attacked any of the Muslim countries to achieve imperial
ambitions, then permission is granted or if Muslims are driven from their homes unjustly
merely for their saying: “‘Our Lord is Allah’… ” (22: 39-40).
2.) If there is an attack on the public purse of Muslims and the national assets of the
Muslim countries.
3.) Defending the downtrodden or the oppressed (mustad’afin) who do not have the
ability to defend themselves against the injustices and hostility perpetrated by the
oppressors (mustakbirin)163
Historically, Hezbollah has symbolically used the martyrdom of Imam Hussein
Ibn Ali and the reenactment of the Karbala Drama as a reminder of oppression and to use
jihad in defense of the umma. The Karbala Drama refers to the martyrdom of Imam
Hussein Ibn Ali by the forces of Yazid, Caliph of the Umayyad dynasty. Imam Hussein’s
martyrdom in an effort to uproot despotism from the umma is used by Hezbollah as a
metaphor to construct the ideas of jihad, martyrdom, and oppression. That is, by invoking
the Karbala Drama, Hezbollah is constructing religious motifs and symbolism to provide
legitimacy to its norm construction. Hezbollah’s Defensive Jihad is rooted in the party’s
hostility towards Israel and its occupation of South Lebanon. Hezbollah is reconstructing
its identity by historically engaging in jihad against Israel and by declaring its
unwavering support for a sovereign Palestine. In doing so, Hezbollah is constructing the
162
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norm of resistance, resistance to occupation and Zionism. In a form of norm contestation,
Israel constructs Iran and its allies, including Hezbollah, as the greatest threat to “world
peace,” citing Iran’s nuclear ambitions as a palpable threat. Hezbollah also constructs
Zionism as the principal threat to the Middle East and to the umma. Indeed, we live in a
social world constructed by intersubjective meanings. Without interaction, Hezbollah and
Israel would be incapable of being in a contestation of norms or unable to construct
identities for the Other. Despite the terrorist label often exploited as a rhetorical
bludgeon, Norton argues that so long as Israel occupied swathes of Lebanese land
Hezbollah and other Lebanese factions were completely within their legal rights to resist
Israeli occupation and to do so with lethal violence.164 Israel eventually withdrew in May
2000. From Hezbollah’s perspective, it was jihad and the valiancy of the mujahdin that
expelled Israel from the security zone and not land-for-peace deals.165 Sayyid Nasrallah
enjoins: “‘We want to make peace for our umma with our blood, rifles, and severed limbs
… This is the peace we believe in’.”166 The party’s hostility towards Zionism and
occupation illustrates the movement’s commitment to jihad, not only as a military
struggle, but also an ideological one, grounded in fighting imperialism and oppression.
Defensive Jihad may also be nonviolent. Sayyid Nasrallah explains the difference
between armed and unarmed struggle: “‘An armed struggle means fighting the enemy
with blood and involves martyrdom. An unarmed struggle involves political, economic,
and cultural means’.”167 In reference to his party’s policy of Lebanonization, Nasrallah
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goes on to state: “‘Our defensive jihad in Lebanon involves both’,”168 armed and
unarmed jihad. The decision of whether to participate in armed or unarmed Defensive
Jihad is left up to circumstances and is often left to the discretion of each individual. In
line with its commitment to infitah, Hezbollah has vowed not to turn its guns on fellow
compatriots, but instead engage in unarmed struggle that involves “conquer[ing] the state
from the bottom up.”169 This means striving politically and economically, lobbying
government, participating in elections, and joining a multi-confessional cabinet.170
Nasrallah’s position is that to reach Lesser Jihad one must first reach the level of
felicity in Greater Jihad because the struggle with oneself is greater than the enemy.
Once Greater Jihad is achieved, then one may proceed and strive for Lesser Jihad.
Hezbollah constructs Greater Jihad to be more challenging than Lesser Jihad. Therefore,
the success of Lesser Jihad is dependent upon the success of Greater Jihad. According to
Saad-Ghorayeb, this is primarily due to man’s worldly desires and temptations and the
difficulties in trying to battle or overcome such desires.171 Notably, Hezbollah did not
always engage in Lesser Jihad. In Hezbollah’s early years, party cadres were required to
devote themselves to Greater Jihad. The intention was to spiritually improve and reform
the inner-self into a faithful confluent human-being.172 Once Greater Jihad was achieved,
members could then engage the enemy using Lesser Jihad. Hezbollah understood that to
defeat Israel militarily through Lesser Jihad, one had to defeat his greatest foe, himself.
“Accordingly, the raison d’être of the Greater Jihad is the Lesser Jihad, for the
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performance of the former necessarily entails a willingness to fulfil the latter.”173
Therefore, Lesser Jihad is contingent upon Greater Jihad, and as a result, only regarded
as greater in that sense. In a nutshell, Hezbollah prides itself as the defender of Arab
lands and the downtrodden. This remains an integral element of its identity and norm
construction. Jihad is only one of the essential ways Hezbollah constructs the norm of
resistance, but one of the most important ideas constructed by the movement. Defensive
Jihad is required of every Muslim and is “one of the eight ‘Ibadat (ritual practices) of
Shi’ite Islam. This religious observance is grounded not only in the logic of selfpreservation, but also a function of the Shi’ites’ historical preoccupation with the
rejection of injustice and humiliation.”174 The idea of oppression, suffering, and
humiliation has long been part of the Shi’a psyche. The significance given to Defensive
Jihad in the religio-political thought of Hezbollah and in Shi’ism is generally not relevant
in Sunni Islam, which places equal importance on all Islamic requirements.175 In fact,
preserving the umma from external danger by engaging in Defensive Jihad is constructed
by Grand Ayatollah Khomeini and Hezbollah to be more important than praying or
fasting. Concomitantly, those who fail to engage in any type of jihad will live in shame,
eventually giving in to his or her enemies’ demands, losing his or her religiosity which
strengthens the self and weakens the enemy.176
Hezbollah’s jihad has indeed changed over time, especially following May 2000.
As the numbers suggest, the party’s engagement in defensive military jihad witnessed a
dramatic drop in 2001, when compared to years 1996 to 2000. The party reached a peak
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of 4,928 operations for 1996-2000, but dwindled to 16 operations by 2001-2. The
unconditional withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon explains the party’s change in
defensive military jihad. Following Israel’s withdrawal from South Lebanon in 2000, the
party began shifting its focus from resistance to the Lebanese political sphere. This is an
exceptional transformation for the movement. Hezbollah had been engaging in Defensive
Jihad from the late 1980s until 2001. The reconstruction of jihad is not coincidental, but
is a pragmatic shift from the physical expression of resistance to achieving national
political goals by conquering the state from the bottom up. This includes participating in
the Lebanese political system through non-violent means. Up until 2005, Hezbollah could
not fully engage in domestic affairs, such as participating in parliamentary elections,
reforming the confessional political system that has been in place since 1990, or
eradicating corruption that has been plaguing Lebanon for years.177
In 2006, the kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers and Israel’s readiness to seek any
pretext to extirpate the pan-Shi’a movement from the Middle East subsequently resulted
in a war that would span 34 days. Hezbollah shifted once again in 2006 to armed Lesser
Jihad to resist Israeli bellicosity. Immediately following Prime Minister Fouad Siniora’s
sponsored Seven Point truce with Israel, Hezbollah began to embark on a political
campaign, exploiting what the movement called Divine Victory (Nasrallah) in the 2006
war with Israel. The Seven Point Truce was Siniora’s attempt to find a political solution
to the war in 2006. The choice of words, such as divine, helps to galvanize feelings of
religious zeal designed to construct Hezbollah as inspired and protected by God. This
provides legitimacy to Hezbollah’s norm of resistance. In order for resistance to be
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constructed, it must be legitimized. By invoking religious fervor, Hezbollah is
reconstructing the norms of a pan-Shi’a movement which is resisting oppression and
imperialism using jihad and martyrdom. After all, material resistance must be justifiable.
In Lebanon, the state and Hezbollah reserve the right to use force when deemed
necessary. The use of force is legitimatized through Hezbollah’s construction of the norm
of resistance and religiosity. It is also legitimized by the movement’s willingness to
actively participate in elections.
Hezbollah engaged in unarmed Lesser Jihad from 2006 until 2010, demanding to
have a greater role in government. This entailed an internal political battle with the
Siniora government over Hezbollah’s demands to establish a multi-confessional cabinet
that would include members of Hezbollah which the Siniora government argued ran
contrary to the Taif agreement. The goal was for the government to ultimately collapse or
give in to Hezbollah’s demands.178 A part of its policy of infitah and Lebanonization,
Hezbollah sought to reconstruct its identity from pan-Islamism to Lebanon’s most
powerful political force. Against this backdrop, the movement’s national identity took
precedence over pan-Islamism.179 In order to appeal to a larger constituency than the
South, Hezbollah was required to become more open in an effort not to alienate the Sunni
and Christian communities. To do so, its construction of pan-Islamism was quieted, but
not completely abandoned. In 2008, tension between Hezbollah and the central
government was aggravated when Siniora announced that he intended to shut down the
group’s private telecommunication network which serves Hezbollah as an organizational
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platform. This caused Hezbollah to employ armed jihad, resulting in a temporary
takeover of West Beirut by followers. Clashes ensued between government supporters
and Hezbollah members, resulting in the death of 100 people from both sides.180 Conflict
would not subside until Hezbollah’s demands were fully met. Hezbollah reformed the
constitution by transforming the government make-up into a multi-confessional cabinet;
holding more than one-third of cabinet seats, Hezbollah could now effectively overthrow
an unfriendly administration.181 Hezbollah’s resistance shifted from being external to
internal. Hezbollah resisted the social structure of Israeli occupation and began resisting
the dominant confessional system that has been in place since the end of the civil war.
This shift is reflective of Hezbollah’s pledge to Lebanonization. The Party of God was
able to shift its norm of resistance from external to internal following Israel’s withdrawal
in 2000. Once Israel withdrew from Lebanon, Hezbollah refocused its efforts on
becoming a powerful political force in Lebanon. Hezbollah managed to convince
supporters of its shift in its norm of resistance by constructing the Shias as being
underrepresented in government. Prior to Hezbollah’s first electoral win in 1992, Subhi
Al Tufayli, Hezbollah’s first Secretary-General, was the first to object (and continues to
object) participating in any elections, contending that Hezbollah would be ‘“selling out’”
if it participated in the Lebanese political polity.182 In addition, by engaging in the
political process, Al Tufayli warned, Hezbollah would be transformed from a
revolutionary movement to a party that is politically tamed.183 Al Tufayli resigned in
protest in 1991. Hezbollah was, and remains, armed. By reserving a spot in the
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government’s cabinet, Hezbollah is ensuring that it remains armed and capable of vetoing
any proposed bill perceived to be a danger to the Party of God.184
While Hezbollah defined itself as a jihadi movement, its ideas of jihad have
changed. Since the Israeli withdrawal from the security zone in 2000, and after 2006,
Hezbollah shifted from Lesser Jihad to Greater Jihad. That is, Hezbollah has
(re)constructed its normative ideology from a violent pan-Shi’a movement seeking
national liberation to a mainstream political party whose goal is to internally reform the
Lebanese political polity. Resistance and jihad have become internalized despite
Hezbollah’s jihad being historically constructed as an external struggle, manifested
through violence. During Hezbollah’s early years (1978-1990) the movement focused on
inner-spirituality, religious indoctrination, self-discipline, and obedience to God, Islam,
and waliyat al- faqih. Greater Jihad also extended to the movement’s selection and
enrolment process and recruitment. Upon recruitment into Hezbollah, trainees were
required to engage in Greater Jihad as a means of self-enrichment in order to properly
prepare for Lesser Jihad. Until then, Lesser Jihad was strictly prohibited.185 Beginning in
1992, Hezbollah’s participation in Lebanon’s first general elections since the start of the
civil war signaled a dramatic shift in jihad. Hezbollah’s Greater Jihad did not remain
confined to the inner practices of the movement, but extended to the political application
of fighting venality in the Lebanese political sphere. Soon after Israel withdrew from
Lebanon in May 2000, Hezbollah was able to mobilize greater resources and fully engage
in Greater Jihad, otherwise not possible because of occupation. Its goal in engaging in
Greater Jihad in Lebanese domestic politics is to demonstrate that the Party of God is the
184
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most dominant political force in the country.186 More importantly, Hezbollah understands
that in order to continue constructing the process of resistance it must remain armed.
Hezbollah remains steadfast in its promise to conquer Lebanon from the bottom up
through pragmatism and democratic elections. Votes are required without alienating
others, such as the Sunni and Christian communities. Hezbollah’s norm construction, as a
result of its integration into the political sphere, shifted from moqawama Islamiyya
(Islamic resistance) to moqawama Lebananiyya (Lebanese resistance). Consequently,
Hezbollah is applying its policy of Lebanonization and is reconstructing jihad. The
movement is reconstructing jihad as inclusive and “Lebanese.” Jihad has become a
national project.
To summarize, jihad’s operational changes, Hezbollah has shifted from Greater
Jihad in 2001 following Israel’s unconditional withdrawal from Lebanon to Lesser Jihad
during the 34 day war with Israel in 2006. Shortly after, Hezbollah shifted again to
unarmed struggle staging protests in the hopes of placing pressure on the Siniora
government. Next, the movement employed armed jihad, which resulted in the death of
100 people, to contest Siniora’s plan to shut down the group’s network. Beginning in
2013, Hezbollah employed lesser armed jihad once again when it intervened in the Syrian
conflict. This event illustrates not only a change in jihad, but also a shift in Hezbollah’s
policy of Lebanonization. It reverted back to before 2005, when Hezbollah was
constructed as a transnational non-state actor, serving the Syrian leadership. However,
during this period jihad also reverted back to Greater Jihad. That is, following Siniora’s
decision to grant Hezbollah’s demands, the movement swiftly shifted back to Greater
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Jihad, although currently Hezbollah practices lesser armed jihad in Syria. In 2006 the
movement reached its peak as the region’s steadfast resistance movement par excellence.
However, waging armed jihad in Lebanon and in Syria has quickly proved to be harmful
to Hezbollah’s legitimacy as a resistance movement. Since 2013, Hezbollah has struggled
to symbolize resistance in the region. Indeed, jihad in all its various forms is one the most
important constructions in Hezbollah’s ideology.

Martyrdom
Martyrdom is an essential element of Hezbollah’s ideology. Despite the movement’s
pragmatism, martyrdom remains one of the most important ways Hezbollah physically
expresses its norm of resistance. The question of why Imam Hussein continued his
journey despite the warnings, to Hezbollah, emphasizes his sacrifice made for the umma,
as it was clear what his fate would be if he continued on to Kufa. The idea of the Karbala
Drama187 is so prolific that without it, Hezbollah claims, there would have not been an
Islamic Resistance in Lebanon.188 As constructed by Hezbollah, the Karbala Drama
signifies resistance to oppression, humiliation, and living a life in disgrace. Hussein,
through the use of jihad, embraced the virtue of martyrdom illustrating that life is not

The Karbala Drama refers to the reconstruction of Imam Hussein Ibn Ali’s
martyrdom in Karbala. He travelled with a caravan of 70 people to challenge the
legitimacy of Umayyad Caliph Yazid who was accused of despotism.
Hezbollah have canonized Hussein as the embodiment of jihad, martyrdom, and
resistance. Today, the self-sacrifice of Imam Hussein is commemorated
annually on the tenth day of the Islamic month of Muharrem, known as Ashura.
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worth living if one does not live with honour.189 The idea of martyrdom is only seen
through the social construct of the Karbala Drama. Hezbollah, as a norm entrepreneur,
uses the construction of Shi’a history to justify its norm of resistance. In other words,
Imam Hussein’s martyrdom is a social construct, helping to construct a reality of
martyrdom for Hezbollah to follow.
For a comprehensive understanding of martyrdom, I combine Momen’s and
Moussalli’s definitions. According to Momen, “‘the ultimate in [self]-sacrifice [altruism]
is martyrdom, in which a person sacrifices his or her own life itself for religion’.”190 The
highest and most decorated type of jihad in Islam is martyrdom. Moussalli explains that a
martyr has a special place in Islam, as he or she is not judged for past transgressions, but
instead is reserved a spot in paradise. Muslims historically and theoretically used
martyrdom as a means of defending themselves and their property often against nonMuslims.191 Notably, martyrdom operations, or suicide missions as they are named in the
West are not exclusive to Islam. Historically, martyrdom operations have also been
nationalistic in nature, aimed at ending imperial occupation. Examples include Chinese
communists during the revolt in Shanghai, China in 1927, the Japanese Kamikaze during
World War II, the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka and India, the Kurdistan Worker’s Party
(PKK) in Turkey, and the Indian Babbar Khalsa International (BKI).192
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Hezbollah has constructed four senses of martyrdom as thawabit. Thawabit refers
to “immutable principles” or a set of recognized rules and norms.193 Discussing all four
are out of the scope of this thesis, and thus, only the first two will be discussed.
The first element of martyrdom deployed is al-shahid al-mujahid (martyr
fighter).This is a Muslim engaging in Lesser Jihad who, while battling the enemy, dies
on the battlefield but does not die by exploding himself. Instead, he is killed through
conventional warfare, such as Hadi Nasrallah, son of Sayyed Nasrallah, who died in 1997
while fighting an Israeli contingent. Hezbollah asserts that al-shahid al-mujahid is pious
and performed an “altruistic and supererogatory act.”194 Al-shahid al-mujahid is neither
washed or wrapped in traditional burial shroud, as per Islamic tradition, but is washed by
the angels.195
The second is al-istishhadi al-mujahid (the martyred fighter). This refers to a
martyr engaging in Lesser Jihad by intentionally becoming a human grenade or by
inflicting the most damage or deaths possible against the enemy on the battlefield until he
dies. Hezbollah constructs al-istishhadi al-mujahid as a “hardcore altruist” who, similar
to al-shahid al-mujahid, committed a “supererogatory act.”196 For Hezbollah, the
martyred fighter sacrificed him or herself for the maslaha or benefit of his or her
community and the umma. His or her sacrifice is constructed by Hezbollah as an action
that is beyond the “call of duty,” as it is not incumbent on Muslims to engage in the act of
martyrdom. Hezbollah affirms that the Prophet Muhammed enjoined that al-istishhadi al-
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mujahid is also not washed or wrapped in burial shroud, as the hadith reveals that the
angles will wash him or her.197 Ayatollah Muhammed Hussein Fadlallah198 posits that a
martyred fighter “‘differs little from that of a soldier who fights and knows that in the end
he will be killed. The two situations lead to death; except that one fits in with the
conventional procedures of war, and the other does not’.” Fadlallah continues, ‘“the
Muslims believe that you struggle by transforming yourself into a living bomb like you
struggle with a gun in your hand. There is no difference between dying with a gun in your
hand or exploding yourself’.” He adds, “‘What is the difference between setting out for
battle knowing you will die after killing ten [enemy soldiers], and setting out to the field
to kill ten and knowing you will die while killing them’?”199 Fadlallah was not the
architect behind martyrdom operations. They were first sanctioned for men and women
by the Supreme Leader Khomeini who exploited their usefulness during the Iran-Iraq
War enjoining that they signified the highest level of altruism for the sake of Islam.
“‘[A]s Shi‘ites we welcome any opportunity for sacrificing our blood. Our nation looks
forward to an opportunity for self-sacrifice and martyrdom’.” He added, ‘“red death is
better than a black life’.”200 Thus, the difference between the two is that al-shahid almujahid is a fighter “who falls on the battlefield while facing the enemy.”201 Al-istishhadi
al-mujahid is the willingness of a fighter to explode him or herself in an effort to inflict
maximum damage on the enemy.
Alagha (a), 108.
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He was not affiliated with the movement officially, but unofficially he
influenced many of Hezbollah’s ideas. He insisted that he is independent of any
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Hezbollah stresses that martyrdom is a selfless act, characterized by freewill and
the preference of paradise over life. Hezbollah succeeded in stimulating this feeling of
self-sacrifice through Greater Jihad, and as a result, there was no shortage of martyrs
willing to die for Hezbollah. Through the social construction of the Karbala narrative and
the fervor of religious discipline and devotion, Hezbollah is able to continuously
construct the idea of martyrdom. By constructing martyrdom as a religious act of selfsacrifice, in line with Greater Jihad, would-be martyrs are willing to sacrifice themselves,
similarly to how Imam Hussein sacrificed himself for Islam. In addition, each martyrdom
operation conducted by the Islamic Resistance must be accorded a fatwa, a religious
edict, granted by the faqih or jurist in order for it to be considered martyrdom not
suicide.202 Indeed, Hezbollah enjoys popular support by understanding that identity and
perception are important elements in global politics. It is important for Hezbollah to be
perceived as good Muslims by the Lebanese citizenry, dedicated to the preservation of
the umma and Lebanon rather than as sinners who commit suicide. After all, who would
be willing to die for an organization known for being heretical. Fadlallah justified
martyrdom missions as legitimate, conducted under the umbrella of jihad. Martyrdom
operations were designed to end the occupation of South Lebanon against the usurper of
Arab lands by any means necessary. He further asserted that “‘a person must face power
with equal or superior power. If it is legitimate to protect one’s life, land, and destiny,
then all means of self-defence become legitimate’.”203 Fadlallah is legitimizing the norm
of resistance and constructing a reality that martyrdom is religiously sanctioned under the
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conditions of occupation by a superior military power. Resistance is made a political
norm, by being made a religious norm.
As a preconstruction, Hezbollah has reconstructed martyrdom as an
honourable act conducted as a means to self-determination in times of war. Martyrdom is
defined and deployed as an act that cleanses one’s soul, a choice of the afterlife over
worldly desires, and a choice to die with honour rather than live in shame perpetuated by
occupation. Nasrallah reminds his supporters of a saying by Imam Ali: “‘one thousand
strikes of the sword are easier than one death on the mattress’.”204 Unique to Hezbollah’s
reconstruction of resistance is its use of Shi’a history, more specifically the self-sacrifice
of Imam Hussein to free the umma from Caliph Yazid’s tyranny. This deviates away
from the common understanding of martyrdom in Sunni Islam. Again, Nasrallah is
reconstructing the norm of resistance by using religious symbolism to sanction the act of
self-sacrifice. Hezbollah’s religious symbolism is not given, but rather its meanings are
constructed and reconstructed continuously through narratives, edicts, and proverbs of
religious leaders revered in Islam. By invoking the teachings of Imam Ali, Sayyed
Nasrallah is constructing the norm of resistance as something divinely-willed. This is part
of Hezbollah’s attempt to internalize the norm of resistance. If the act of self-sacrifice is
religiously sanctioned, then politically it becomes a legal method of war in combating
occupation, imperialism, and oppression. This is one way Hezbollah (re)constructs
resistance as a norm.
In November 1982, in the Southern city of Tyre, a white Mercedes strapped with
explosives drove into an Israeli headquarters and intelligence center destroying the eight204
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storey building and killing 141 Israeli personnel. This would be Hezbollah’s first
martyrdom operation. Hezbollah’s first contemporary martyr, Ahmed Qasir, shocked the
Israelis who did not anticipate such an attack and did not understand what had happened.
Israeli authorities continued for years to insist that the explosion was caused by a gas
leak. In 1982, Hezbollah was not formally established and instead was composed of
several factions that were clandestine, but the Party of God claims this operation as its
own.205 This was part of Hezbollah attempting to construct itself. This would be the first
of many martyrdom operations conducted by the Islamic Resistance until the final Israeli
withdrawal in 2000. It is interesting to note that during Hezbollah’s early years (19781984/5) a martyred fighter had to be able to kill at least 30 people for an operation to be
categorized a religious martyrdom.206 Beginning in 1985 this was no longer a prerequisite
for martyrdom operations. However, Sayyed Nasrallah asserts that martyrdom operations
are not indiscriminate despite the eagerness of many young would-be martyrs. He
contends that if the operation is not fruitful and does not inflict as much damage as
possible against the enemy, then the operation is unsanctioned because it would be
inhumane, legally and religiously. By extension, there are restrictions placed on
martyrdom. Nasrallah concludes, “even when we perform jihad and seek martyrdom, we
do so only in order to achieve victory,” which is a reward for Lebanon and the people.207
For Hezbollah and Lebanese Shi’a, Israel signified oppression and represented the role of
Caliph Yazid in the Karbala Drama and Hezbollah, as the symbol of resistance and
mobilization, is the contemporary of Imam Hussein’s resistance to Umayyad rule.
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According to Hamzeh, militant operations conducted by the Islamic Resistance
reached almost 5,000 (4,928 to be exact) for the period between 1996-2000. Militant
operations dramatically decreased from 2001-2004 where the number of operations
hardly reached 20.208 In fact, the last martyrdom operation conducted by the Islamic
Resistance was in 1999 and not in 2006 as many claimed.209 Obviously, there are changes
in Hezbollah’s martyrdom. The first change is in Hezbollah’s religious construction.
Martyrdom is no longer couched in religiosity as it once was in the early 1980s.
Beginning in 1991, Hezbollah began to include nationalism as part of its policy of infitah
and Lebanonization, justifying martyrdom as a national duty in contrast to exclusively
relying on Islamic symbolism or the Karbala Drama. Hezbollah no longer uses religion as
a justification for martyrdom. Instead, it is a national duty in the preservation of
Lebanon’s borders initially from Israeli aggression, but now from Sunni extremists, such
as the Islamic State. The umma has been replaced with protecting the honour and pride of
the “nation.” Changing Hezbollah’s religious tone was a political strategy that was
implemented prior to the parliamentary elections in 1992. Indeed, the Party of God felt
that ideas closely associated with Shi’ism might alienate voters, notably Christian and
even Sunni voters, therefore, they had to be quieted. Notably, this does not mean that
Hezbollah dismissed religion completely, but it was commonly understood among all
Lebanese factions, secular or Islamist, that the Israeli occupation of South Lebanon was
scurrilous and humiliating.210
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The most important change following Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon was the
typology of martyrdom. Al-istishhadi al-mujahid is no longer used by the Islamic
Resistance as the conventional weapon of war. Instead, Hezbollah emphasizes al-shahid
al-mujahid as the contemporary method of warfare. Another important change involved
the construction of the enemy. Following 2006, Hezbollah no longer battled what it
called the “Zionist entity.” Instead, the resistance or the battle became more internalized
and less regional. The shift occurred even before 2006. Following Israel’s withdrawal
from Lebanon in May 2000, Hezbollah began to focus on domestic politics and Greater
Jihad. This policy also included abandoning martyrdom and attempting to adapt and
integrate into the Lebanese polity. Hezbollah was able to construct itself as a party able to
adapt to an ever-changing environment. However, this changed in 2013 when Hezbollah
actively involved itself in the Syrian crisis. Hezbollah’s focus shifted from resisting the
alien entity in the Arab world, known as Israel, to resisting “terrorist” cells operating in
Syria which Hezbollah constructs as proxies working to remove Bashar Al Assad from
power. In line with the shift in martyrdom, Hezbollah’s fighters are no longer human
grenades, but are battling the enemy as soldiers and dying on the battlefield from wounds
and gunfire. This is in contrast to Ahmed Qasir who drove his Mercedes into an Israeli
intelligence building, hoping to inflict as much damage as possible, while sacrificing
himself in the process. The ultimate sacrifice the Party is making now is being involved
in the Syrian crisis. Hezbollah initially constructed martyrdom as a purely religious duty.
From 1985 to 1991, the Party of God changed its religious stance, while maintaining that
self-sacrifice will lead to paradise. During this period, Hezbollah became more
politicized, constructing the norms of pan-Arabism, pan-Islamism, fighting oppression,
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anti-Zionism, and anti-imperialism. From 1992 on, Hezbollah began advocating
secularism and constructing a nationalistic agenda. Martyrdom is now constructed as a
purely national duty, framed in the context of preserving the “nation’s” integrity and
dignity (‘izzat wa karamat al umma). Fighting occupation through martyrdom was
reconstructed as a nationalistic and religious duty. That is, martyrdom was constructed as
a norm legitimized by preserving the dignity and honour of the nation that has been
hindered by the shame of occupation.211 Hezbollah has continued constructing
martyrdom in the context of nationalism, as evidenced in the Syrian crisis. Indeed,
Hezbollah is not the first nor is it unique in framing martyrdom in nationalistic terms.
Other Islamist movements who have constructed martyrdom as a national duty include
Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood and Palestine’s HAMAS. Sayyed Nasrallah has repeatedly
claimed that the Syrian crisis is a proxy war designed to destroy the country, its army,
and its people.212 Against this backdrop, Hezbollah has intervened to help resist such a
project from being realized. Hezbollah is constructing its involvement in Syria as an
effort to protect Lebanon’s eastern border. Hezbollah contends that its intervention in
Syria is intended to deter takfiri groups from crossing over into Lebanon. Accordingly,
Hezbollah has stationed its fighters along the Lebanese-Syrian border. There are no
shortages of Hezbollah fighters in Syria willing to sacrifice themselves for the social
construction of Lebanese sovereignty. That is, and despite objections from some fighters
unwilling to be deployed to Syria, Hezbollah continues to deploy fighters to Syria in a
continued effort to rescue the resistance bloc and protect Lebanon’s border with Syria.
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Martyrdom, as a social construct, is one of the most important ideas in
Hezbollah’s ideology. The Party of God sought to escape from its grassroots as a
clandestine organization and express its pragmatism. To express its pragmatism, it was
required for martyrdom to change, but it was never abandoned and remains a normative
idea intimately involved with Hezbollah. By the same token, martyrdom is used until
today, but is practiced differently from the days of the Israeli occupation of Lebanon.
Presently, al-istishhadi al-mujahid has been abandoned in favour of a more
contemporary style of warfare exhibited in al-shahid al-mujahid. Despite Hezbollah
applying its policies of infitah and Lebanonization to martyrdom, the idea was never and
will likely never be abandoned; like jihad, martyrdom was differently constructed
according to the Lebanese political climate. Al-shahid al-mujahid, is, however, practiced
currently in Syria against Islamic State (IS) and other “Sunni extremists.” Fuller and
Francke offer an insightful argument that Shi’ism is inherently more rebellious than
Sunnism. The authors note Shi’ism’s history of challenging Umayyad authority and
power as proof that Shi’ism is predisposed to suffering and even coveting martyrdom as
recourse to the Karbala Drama.213 Nevertheless, martyrdom is celebrated annually on
November 11th, the date Ahmed Qasir took his own life. Similar to the West’s
commemoration of war veterans, Martyrdom Day serves as a reminder of the sacrifices
made by the Resistance, but equally important it is the continuous reconstruction of
Hezbollah’s ideas that have been physically expressed.214
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The Oppressed/Oppressors Dichotomy
Hezbollah has constructed a social structure of occupation by identifying itself as a
resistance movement. As a resistance movement, it is attempting to challenge the Israeli
occupation by any means. Hezbollah adopted the role of the oppressed while Israel had
been, and continues to be, constructed as the oppressor. Adopted from Khomeini’s
ideology, Hezbollah’s resistance is grounded in the dichotomy of the oppressed versus
the oppressor. The dichotomy of oppression is reflective of the Karbala Drama, whereby
Caliph Yazid symbolizes oppression and Iman Hussein signifies the oppressed.215 At one
time or another, the Shah, the United States, Israel, and Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war have
all been constructed to be Yazid, and Khomeini and his allies as the embodiment of Imam
Hussein Ibn Ali.216 It is a reference to the Quranic theme of good versus evil locked in a
zero-sum game of epic proportions whereby the oppressed defeat the oppressors. This
division of the world was first articulated by Khomeini who constructed the identity of
oppressed (mustad’fin) and the oppressors (mustakbirin). The dichotomy of oppression
has been mentioned by Hezbollah in several speeches and the 1985 Open Letter and its
1992 political campaign were addressed to the oppressed.”217 The construction of
oppression in the 1985 Open Letter and Hezbollah’s 1992 political campaign were the
same. In the 1985 Open Letter and in the 1992 political campaign, Hezbollah constructed
itself as the champion of the peasant farmers, the labourers and the poor, the oppressed
and deprived, the workers and homeless. The homeless Hezbollah are referring to are
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those who have no homes as a consequence of Israeli bombardment.218 Hezbollah
became known as the “voice of the downtrodden.” Hussein Al-Mussawi explains that
oppression refers to the refusal of the downtrodden to be oppressed any further.
Ironically, it was the Israeli invasion, occupation, and subjugation of the Shi’a citizenry
that mobilized and even radicalized the sect, paving the way for the establishment of
Hezbollah.219
Hezbollah, Palestinian and pan-Arab liberation movements, and Islamists
construct the Zionists as the ultimate oppressors. Hezbollah also constructs any rule that
is unjust despite religion, race, or creed as oppressive. The same applies to the oppressed.
Despite Khomeini’s dichotomy of oppression having its roots in the Quran, Muslims and
non-Muslims who are socially and economically disadvantaged, politically oppressed and
culturally deprived are considered oppressed, irrespective of their identity or culture.220
Certainly, the Quran does not specify any religion or culture concerning oppression. The
oppressed are also not exclusive to the Global South, but include the Global North as
well. By extension, Iran was active in the 1990s aiding “oppressed” movements such as
the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in Algeria, the National Islamic Movement in Sudan,
HAMAS and Islamic Jihad of Palestine, the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, Al-Nahda in
Tunis, and the Jihad group in Egypt.221 In the past, Iran has aided and supported South
Africa’s Nelson Mandela, the Irish Republican Army (IRA), Daniel Ortega, and Fidel
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Castro who in the eyes of Iran were being oppressed.222 Iran is not only challenging the
geopolitical order of the region by leading the Shi’a revival, but it has in the past
bolstered support for non-Muslim social and even revolutionary movements. However,
Khomeini and Hezbollah have constructed Israel as the first and ultimate oppressor, the
cancerous growth that must be excised by all means. The second order oppressors are
those who occupy land of the oppressed, but again the oppressors are not comparable to
Israel whose very existence is believed to be illegal and illegitimate. The third order
oppressors are dictatorships in the Global South who govern the oppressed with an ironfist and are Western-backed.223
The invasion and occupation of South Lebanon by the Israeli Defense Forces
(IDF) and the South Lebanese Army (SLA) radicalized the Shi’a. As mentioned earlier,
the norm of resistance is rooted in the construction of oppression and in the case of
Hezbollah, resistance is also grounded in occupation. Hezbollah is constructing resistance
within the context of occupation and imperialism. For instance, Hezbollah constructs the
Shebaa Farms as Lebanese territory still under occupation. Consequently, Hezbollah must
continue constructing resistance and remain armed in defense of Lebanese sovereignty.
Another example is Hezbollah’s construction of the Syrian crisis as an imperial project
designed to dismantle the Syrian state. Israel’s aggressive actions against the Shi’a in the
South indeed demonstrated the dichotomy of oppression. In 1982, in an effort to keep the
Shi’a obedient, Israeli forces imposed curfews, conducted wholesale arrests, house
searches, and roadblocks. Economically, the Lebanese market was flooded with Israeli
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commodities for the local population to consume.224 The most striking example of
oppression came during the civil war between September 16 and 18, 1982 when Christian
partisans under the tutelage of the IDF entered the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in a
Southern suburb of Beirut that housed Palestinians and nearly a quarter of Lebanese Shia.
Many residents of the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps were shot, including women and
children. In total 1,500 people died in what became known as the Sabra and Shatila
massacre. This spurred the creation of radical forces, including Hezbollah, and
reconstructed the Shi’a identity which initially welcomed the Israeli invasion, as they
believed the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) brought only more problems to
Lebanon, especially the south. Afwaj al-Muqawmat al-Lubnaniyya (AMAL) was one of
the forces that was displeased with the Palestinian Liberation Organization using South
Lebanon as a launching pad to commit attacks against Israel. The misery of the Shi’a was
chronic, as refugee camps meant for Palestinians swelled with Shi’a refugees escaping
Israeli bombardment in the south, coupled with an economic blockade and the
obliteration of southern agriculture. Currently a museum, Al-Khiam prison serves as a
constant reminder of Israel’s and the South Lebanon Army’s oppression. This only
further contributes to Hezbollah’s norm of resistance. Hezbollah continuously constructs
the Al-Khiam museum as a place to remember oppression and occupation. The Al-Khiam
prison could have been left as an abandoned site, for example, or converted back into a
chemical plant following Israel’s withdrawal in May 2000. Instead, Hezbollah and the
Lebanese government chose to convert it into a museum. Al-Khiam prison helps
Hezbollah’s case as a norm entrepreneur attempting to legitimize the norm of resistance.
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According to Finnemore and Sikkink, one of the ways a new norm may be accepted is if
it has intrinsic qualities.225 Al-Khiam prison, as a detention center designed to destroy the
morale of the resistance through torture, violated all universal norms of behaviour,
including human rights. Norms which have intrinsic characteristics, such as human rights,
are more likely to be adopted or recognized. Through Al-Khiam prison, Hezbollah is
legitimizing its norm construction by illustrating how the detention center symbolized
oppression. To resist torture as a tactic of war is widely accepted. Al-Khiam prison
constructs what Hezbollah has been resisting. Oppression is constructed as the backbone
of Hezbollah’s resistance.
Hezbollah’s construction of oppressed and oppressor has shifted. In Hezbollah’s
construction, oppressors are often the colonizers or despotic rulers and the oppressed are
referred to as the occupied or those who are economically and socially disadvantaged,
and culturally deprived. According to Hezbollah, however, Israel is the embodiment of
oppression, and therefore, Hezbollah’s construction of Israel as the ultimate oppressor is
unchanged. Between the years of 1978 and 1984/5, Hezbollah constructed the Maronites,
the United States, France, and Israel as the oppressors and the periphery states or the
Global South as the oppressed. The French historically favoured the Christians, and thus,
drafted Lebanon’s confessional system to allocate the majority of the political power to
the Maronites. The Christian Maronites occupied the position of the presidency while
their Sunni counterparts occupied the role of prime minister and the Shi’as were assigned
the figurative role of speaker of the house. In a national consensus conducted in 1932,
France as the colonial power at the time, included the Shi’as who resided in mainly
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Christian areas of Lebanon as Christian. In other parts of the country, the Shi’as were
counted as either Sunni or Christians. The results, indeed manipulated, illustrated that the
Shi’as were the third largest confessional group. The Shi’as held some power, but it was
not an accurate representation of the community.226 The Shi’a community constructed an
identity of the downtrodden as they were politically underrepresented, and as a result,
third-class citizens. Hezbollah constructed the U.S. and France as oppressors because
they were considered occupying forces under the pretext of peace-keeping during the
civil war. The Global South was composed of colonial states formerly under British or
French rule. It was also made up of states that were victims of U.S. aggression, such as
Grenada, Nicaragua, and Iran. This changed in the years between 1984/5 and 1990 where
Quranic expressions took precedence and terminology such as Great and Little Satan
became metaphors. Great and Little Satan refers to the United States and Israel
respectively.227 Hezbollah’s construction of oppression changed to be less political and
more grounded in religiosity. Some verses from the Holy Quran (34:31-33) help to
decipher between the oppressed and oppressor.228 From 1991 onwards, Hezbollah’s
notion of oppressed did not change. However, the idea of oppressor shifted. During the
civil war, Hezbollah constructed the Lebanese state, including political Maronism as
illegitimate. Initially, Hezbollah condemned the Lebanese confessional system as
oppressive, serving the interests of the Christian Maronites. Despite this, and with the
encouragement of Fadlallah and permission from Khamenei, Hezbollah participated in
parliamentary elections for the first time in 1992 and municipal elections in 2005.
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Hezbollah is currently a member of the national multi-confessional cabinet with veto
power. Internationally, France is no longer regarded as an oppressor or Great Satan,
notably due to Iran’s recent nuclear deal and the warming of relations between the two
states.229 This change reveals that a part of Hezbollah’s norm entrepreneurship relates to
Iranian foreign policy. Since 2013, Hezbollah has constructed the Syrian people and the
Syrian Arab Army as being oppressed by the GCC, the United States, and Israel. As the
Lebanese once were, the Syrian people are now being oppressed by a civil war that is
devastating the country with far-reaching implications. Syrians are not the only ones
being oppressed. On April 17, 2015, Sayyed Nasrallah proclaimed Hezbollah’s
unflagging support for the “oppressed” Yemeni people who are victims of Saudi-US
aggression.230 The Yemeni people, according to Sayyed Nasrallah, are currently being
bombarded by a Saudi-led campaign known as Operation Decisive Storm aimed at
reinstating the President, Abdel Rabbah Mansour Hadi, who was forced into exile by
Shi’a Houthi rebels backed by the former President of Yemen, Ali Abdullah Saleh. As a
norm entrepreneur, the narrative of oppression is continuously being reconstructed
according to Hezbollah’s changing domestic, regional, and international environments.
Hezbollah has socially constructed a reality that the Syrian President and
Yemen’s Houthis are victims of a wider project to overhaul the regional order of the
Middle East. It is not necessarily important to determine who lies where in Hezbollah’s
dichotomy of oppression, but to understand that oppression continues to be made a
central theme in Hezbollah’s ideology. Until today, the region remains a target of
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penetration through military bases, treaties, arms deals, and military intervention, such as
the invasion of Iraq in 2003.231
As a norm entrepreneur, the identity and norms of Hezbollah help to construct the
normative idea of oppression. Fadlallah elucidates this point by positing that “‘oppressed
people cannot always behave in a reasonable manner…the weak will fight to defend their
interests, even if they have to use knives and stones to spread chaos throughout the
world’.”232 As an agent once in a social structure of Israeli occupation, Hezbollah’s desire
to construct its identity as the “party of the oppressed” and the “voice of the
downtrodden” is intentional and appealing not only to the party’s local constituency, but
to the Arab world that advocates for resistance as the only response to oppression,
subjugation, and occupation. The social construction of oppression is demonstrated
continuously through speeches conducted by Hezbollah, statements from the Quran, the
annual commemoration of Martyrdom Day, and Al-Khiam museum. By socially
reconstructing an identity of oppression, Hezbollah is reaching into the heart of Arab
grievances as former victims of European imperialism and currently victims of Israel’s
expansionist policies. Effectively, Hezbollah is reconstructing a reality of oppression in
order to justify its resistance norm. Hezbollah is attempting to legitimize its norm of
resistance by appealing to the oppressed of the world. Hezbollah is constructing
resistance as a universally accepted response to oppression and occupation. As a norm
entrepreneur, Hezbollah is claiming its resistance norm as universal.
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Anti-imperialism
Hezbollah’s normative idea of anti-imperialism has its roots in the Israeli occupation of
Lebanon. The social structure of oppression and occupation created resentment and
hostility and demonized Israel as the ultimate oppressor that needs to be stopped. More
importantly, it is an entity that cannot and will not be recognized, as Israel is the usurper
of Arab lands, including Palestine, the Golan Heights, and the Shebaa Farms. Tripp
explains that resistance in any form is a means of trying to gain recognition of one’s
dignity.233 The grievances held by Hezbollah do not only extend to the state of Israel, but
to the Western powers, most notably the United Sates whose unequivocal aid and support
has made Israel the most powerful state in the region. Hezbollah is determined to
challenge the power of the United States and its ally Israel by countering their influence
in the region. As previously mentioned in chapter one, the Party of God can be
understood as being anti-globalization, anti-imperialist, anti-Western, and anti-Zionist.
Due to its history as a resistance movement, Hezbollah has continuously reconstructed
the identity of being the Vietcong of the Litani, in honour of Vietnam’s guerilla’s
resistance movement during the Vietnam War (1965-1973) and in reference to South
Lebanon’s river, the Litani River. The Party of God also lambastes Arab states that have
had relations or peace negotiations with Israel, including Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states
who are often accused of being America’s collaborators in the region. The plundering of
Arab resources, namely oil and water, by the United States and Israel only exacerbates
matters further.
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Hezbollah’s animosity to imperialism was made public in the 1985 Open Letter
which was presented first as a public speech on February 16, 1985. In a section titled
“Our History with the Imperialists,” Hezbollah began by stating “O humble and
honorable oppressed” Hezbollah condemns the “crimes” committed by the United States
in Vietnam, Iran, Nicaragua, Grenada, Palestine, Lebanon and we also condemn Soviet
intervention in Afghanistan, its interference with Iran’s affairs, its backing of the conflict
with Iraq, and so forth.234 In regards to Israel, Hezbollah considers it the American
foothold in the Muslim World. Israel, the master of Zionism poses the greatest risk to the
Arab world, as the occupation of Palestine is only stage one of a grand expansionist
strategy of establishing a Greater Israel which would include the Euphrates River in Iraq
to the Nile of Egypt.235 The Party of God has an ideological battle with Israel as it is the
party’s adversary since its inception, as it was established on stolen land at the expense of
the Muslim umma. Hezbollah’s confrontation, therefore, with the Zionist entity can only
cease to exist when Israel ceases to exist. By extension, the Party of God reserves the
right to reject any cease-fire, peace talks, truce, and reject any communication with
Israel.236 As an agent, Hezbollah must continuously reconstruct the social structure of
occupation in order for the Party of God to remain armed and constructed as a resistance
movement. Since Israel’s occupation of Lebanon, in large part, has ceased to exist as a
social structure, the movement is in need of fresh conflicts to legitimize its norm of
resistance. Its confrontation with Israel is ideological, but Hezbollah understands that the
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existence of Israel provides legitimacy to its norm construction. In chapter one of the
party’s Political Manifesto published in 2009 titled “Hegemony and the Awakening”
Hezbollah explains that the United States sees the world as a marketplace in need of
exploitation. Moreover, American hegemony is unique to the world because of its
inherent belief that it owns the world and that Americans are naturally superior beings.
Therefore, the Western and especially the American expansionist strategy conjoined with
their capitalist economic plan is global in scale and is a strategy of unlimited exploitation
and greed.237 Hezbollah is not only constructing a reality of political resistance, but there
is also an economic dimension to its resistance. Sayyed Qassem unequivocally
characterizes anti-imperialism as a dichotomy: the United States and Israel as engineers
of an imperial project on one side and on the other the Islamic Resistance.238 Qassem
explains that the US is able to spread chaos and destruction in the Middle East, extorting
the region’s resources while attacking Arab regimes, political parties, and citizens. In
response, Qassem enjoins that Hezbollah is steadfast in its decision to resist American
exploitation. “Our legitimate right is in itself a source of power, and our logic is
sound.”239 In response to the imperial-Zionist project or occupation by any force,
Hezbollah insists that it is the right and duty of all peoples to resist occupation and
exploitation, politically, culturally, and through education.240 As a norm entrepreneur,
Hezbollah is constructing the norm of resistance by juxtaposing those who are occupying
against those who are fighting occupation. Qassem is constructing a reality whereby
resistance is a requirement meant to prevent American exploitation of the region and its
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resources. Resistance, as it is being constructed, must be the response to more than just
Zionist ambitions. Hezbollah is continuously constructing resistance as the logical
response to safeguarding the Middle East from any form of exploitation. As a norm
entrepreneur, Hezbollah is attempting to construct a reality of U.S. and Israeli
imperialism. Kidnapping of Westerners, for example, during the civil war was
Hezbollah’s way of constructing resistance to any Western presence in the country.
Hezbollah also kidnapped Israeli soldiers, a strategy that proved fruitful in Hezbollah’s
campaign of psychological warfare. Indeed, it caused an emotional burden on Israeli
politicians and Hezbollah hoped that a backlash from the Israeli citizenry would
eventually occur, calling into question the Israeli occupation of Lebanon. Through
kidnappings, Hezbollah manifested the norm of resistance to occupation.
Hezbollah constructs Israeli occupation of Arab lands as humiliating and
oppressive. Hezbollah constructs a reality that through armed military jihad and
martyrdom, the threat of imperialism can be resisted. This position extends to Palestine
and the duty to protect and preserve the third holiest site in Islam, Al Aqsa Mosque. One
of the constructions in Hezbollah’s idea of anti-imperialism has been made to be
combating Israel in an effort to liberate Jerusalem. Nasrallah has previously suggested
that Hezbollah would be willing to send reinforcements, if necessary, to support its
Palestinian brethren. When Sayyed Nasrallah was asked about the 1993 Oslo Accords, he
rebuffed stating that “the land is our land and the holy sites belong to our nation; we want
to live with our honour and freedom in our region of the world. We do not want to beg
for peace and security…We want to forge our nation’s peace with our own blood, guns,
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body parts, and bones; this is the peace we believe in and seek.”241 The idea Hezbollah
mobilizes is that not one Arab state has managed to liberate an inch of Palestine since
1948, which illustrates the ineffectiveness of negotiations. It also makes resistance the
only feasible option when dealing with Israel.242 Hezbollah highlights Jerusalem’s
religious significance to proffer representations that once Jerusalem is free, the umma is
free. In a show of solidarity with Palestine’s claim to Jerusalem as its future capital,
Ayatollah Khomeini created Jerusalem Day, and like Martyrs Day, it is a celebrated
yearly in Iran and by Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Imperialism is not a phenomenon exclusive to the West. Saudi Arabia and the
Gulf states’ Operation Decisive Storm is constructed to be yet another ploy by imperial
powers aimed at partitioning Arab lands. Hezbollah is constructing a reality whereby
Yemen is part of a wider US experiment: “We are confronting a new American scheme, a
plan of occupation of unknown duration. The Americans are looking to establish
permanent military bases-this means that we are facing not only occupation, but a further
consolidation of the US presence.”243 Freeing Palestine is constructed to mean liberating
Iraq, Syria, and Yemen from the vice grip of imperial powers.
Thomas Homer-Dixon published an article in 1994 titled “Environmental
Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases.” His thesis was that future
conflicts will erupt over natural resources, which over time become increasingly scarce.
Homer-Dixon enjoins that depletion and pollution of water supplies may consequently
cause “resource wars.” The author goes on to argue that out of the major environmental
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changes facing the world, degradation and reduction in water supply, among other
resources, will most likely contribute more to social upheaval than climate change or the
depletion of the ozone layer.244 Homer-Dixon’s thesis of resource wars has not proven to
be the norm; however, the depletion of water supply has been historically one of the
underlying tensions between Lebanon and Israel. This, Hezbollah argues, is again part of
Israel’s plan, to usurp not only Arab lands, but also Lebanon’s water supply. Again,
Hezbollah is constructing a reality of an imperial Zionist plot to steal Lebanon’s water
supply. This social construction allows Hezbollah to remain armed in an effort to resist
Israel’s plan to usurp Lebanon’s water, even if land is not occupied. Thus, Hezbollah is
constructing a social structure of continuous conflict, implicit or explicit, with Israel. As
mentioned above, once Israel ceases to exist the confrontation with Zionism will cease to
exist. However, Hezbollah, it seems, desires to reconstruct Zionism as a continuous threat
to Lebanon, despite Israel’s unconditional withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000.
Israel has been enduring a water crisis since its inception. Even before the
establishment of Israel in 1948, the Zionist movement was well aware that the future of a
Jewish state would be in danger without a reliable water source. The reason for Israel’s
sustained water crisis is Israel’s geography of semi-dry to complete desert coupled with
high water demand. The Sea of Galilee provides over one-third of water and another onethird comes from two aquifers, substantial geographical areas of underground catchments
where water accrues. These lie beneath the Gaza Strip and the West Bank,245 which were
seized in 1967. In 2005, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon “disengaged” from Gaza because
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Israel could no longer siphon the amount of water for its demand. Gaza’s water quality
was adversely affected by an increase in salt levels and pollutants, and therefore was
rendered undrinkable and given back to the Palestinians.246 Despite seizing the Shebaa
Farms in 1967, Israel’s solution remained a “well-watered” Lebanon to its north which in
2006 would increase water supply by up to eight hundred million cubic meters (MCM) or
roughly forty percent of its water consumption.247 The Israelis ultimately failed to capture
the Litani River in 2006. Israel managed to pump Lebanese water to Haifa during the
occupation of Lebanon. Water was why the occupation line was the Litani.
The Shebaa Farms borders Lebanon and Syria from the side of the Golan Heights
from the east and Israel from the southeast. Israel considered the Shebaa Farms as a part
of the Golan Heights, and thus, part of the Syrian territory occupied in 1967. Hezbollah
and the Lebanese and Syrian authorities have for decades disputed Israel’s claim that the
Shebaa Farms is Syrian. They argue that the Shebaa Farms is Lebanese and Israel must
withdraw from all Lebanese territory immediately, citing UNSC Resolution 425 which
called on Israel to withdraw its forces from all Lebanese territory. The Shebaa Farms is
22 square kilometers, comprising 2% of Lebanese territory. Israel refused to withdraw
from the Shebaa Farms following May 25, 2000 arguing that it is Syrian territory and is
part of the Golan Heights which was officially annexed in 1981. In a rebuttal, Syria sent a
letter to the UN stating explicitly that the Shebaa Farms does not belong to Syria, but to
Lebanon. In 2001, Sayyed Nasrallah asserted that it is Lebanese land and will be liberated
by any means. Hezbollah, as a norm entrepreneur, is constructing Lebanon as a certain
space that must be liberated through resistance. Moreover, it was through jihad and
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martyrdom, Nasrallah explains, that the Islamic Resistance was able to force Israel to
withdraw from Lebanese territory, not UNSC Resolution 425. Hezbollah is
reconstructing the norm of resistance through the context of occupation and imperialism.
Sayyed Nasrallah is reconstructing a social structure of occupation; that is, that Lebanon
was never completely liberated in May 2000. Until the Shebaa Farms is liberated, the
norm of resistance must continuously be constructed. According to Hezbollah,
negotiations or land-for-peace deals are ineffective methods of diplomacy.
The question remains why does Israel refuse to relinquish the Shebaa Farms?
Despite its size, the Shebaa Farms is rich in water due to high levels of precipitation
mainly accumulated from melting snow corollaries in major underground basins. The
melted snow provides the ground with a number of springs and streams at lower
elevations.248 Hermon Mountain provides much of the water for the Hasbani River, south
of the Shebaa Farms where Israeli engineers have embedded pipes used to siphon
hundreds of cubic meters of water directly into Israel. The Director-General of the Litani
River Authority, Nassar Nasrallah explains that Israel moves two hundred million cubic
meters (MCM) from Lebanon and from those two hundred, one hundred and thirteen
million cubic meters (MCM) comes directly from the Shebaa Farms, Hasbani River, and
Wazani Springs.249 Hezbollah refuses to dismiss Lebanon’s claim to the Shebaa Farms,
although the UN has drawn a blue line effectively leaving the Shebaa Farms to Israel.
Hezbollah continues to construct the Shebaa Farms as part of Lebanon. This construction
allows for Hezbollah to remain armed and allows for ongoing jihad. Sayyed Qassem
states that it is not acceptable to Lebanon or Hezbollah that Lebanon remains occupied.
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From Hezbollah’s perspective, relinquishing any territory is non-negotiable, despite
where it is located and how valuable the land may be. Occupation must end.250
The Shebaa Farms remains a point of contention for all parties involved,
especially Hezbollah which constructs the reality that it has not completely liberated
Lebanon from Israeli occupation. The Party of God asserts that it will remain armed until
the Shebaa Farms returns to Lebanon. Critics accuse the pan-Shi’a party of using the
Shebaa Farms as a pretext to remain armed. Indeed, Hezbollah as a norm entrepreneur
understands that without arms the party can no longer construct the norm of resistance
and to keep its arms, some part of Lebanon must be occupied. A movement cannot be
“resistant” without an arsenal of weapons at its disposal. Following Israel’s withdrawal
from Lebanon on May 25, 2000, Hezbollah continued to conduct operations in the
Shebaa Farms area stating that it will not stop until Israeli forces withdraw from the
Shebaa Farms. As a norm entrepreneur, the continued occupation of the Shebaa Farms is
offering the legitimacy needed for Hezbollah’s continuous norm construction. Resistance
by way of jihad and martyrdom are constructed as the only options when responding to
Israel’s intransigent imperialism.
Certainly Hezbollah’s position on imperialism has shifted over the years. From
1985 until 1991 the party implemented “Westoxification,” however, from 1991 and on
the Party of God adopted a policy of less Westoxification regarding France and the
United Kingdom and the implementation of infitah regarding imperialism and Western
Europe. As forces involved in the civil war began to withdraw their troops, Hezbollah
quieted its construction of Westoxification. Westoxification referred to the spread of
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Western cultural ideals. Hezbollah constructs the idea that the influence of Western
culture is determinantal or toxic to Islamic values and to the livelihood of Islam. The
United Kingdom was constructed as an experienced imperial power that exploited
“defeatist Arab regimes” in the Gulf in an effort to usurp the regions resources.251
Hezbollah’s construction of Westoxification as a normative idea is based upon the French
and American troops that were stationed in Lebanon as a part of the UN peace-keeping
mission, United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Hezbollah’s animosity to
the West extended to non-governmental organizations as well which were once
constructed as agents of Great and Little Satan.252 That is, NGOs that operated in
Lebanon during the period of Westoxification were constructed as extensions of U.S. and
Israeli foreign policy. Consequently, Hezbollah arbitrarily rejected NGOs operating in
Lebanon. Instead, Hezbollah offered similar services offered by Western NGOs. In 1992,
however, Hezbollah, in an effort to construct itself as a pragmatic resistance movement,
began “opening up” and began integrating into Lebanon’s political landscape. The
integration into the Lebanese polity meant that Hezbollah accepted the state’s institutions,
confessional system, the Taif agreement, and the state’s civil institutions. The use of
religious metaphors such as Great and Little Satan emphasizes what Hezbollah constructs
as a battle between the forces of good and evil, where the oppressed are blessed with a
divine victory (Nasrallah). It is important to recognize that the hostility towards the
United States is directed at the administration not the American people. Hezbollah’s
Deputy Chairman of the Executive Council, Sheikh Nabil Qaouk, avers that the United
States is a myriad of nations that hold various opinions regarding U.S. foreign policy. For
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instance, there are millions who sympathize with the Palestinian cause and there are
many who reject America’s policy of interventionism. Therefore, Sheikh Qaouk asserts,
Hezbollah cannot judge America as a whole.253 However, the animosity towards Israel is
directed at the government and at society. Hezbollah perceives that anyone living in
Israel is willingly and willfully living on stolen land, and is therefore, complacent in
contributing to the continued despair of the Palestinian people. Hezbollah’s construction
of the United States and Israel remains unchanged.
In Hezbollah’s Open Letter, the party constructed the UN as faithfully serving the
interests of the West, the United States, and Israel at the expense of the oppressed. As a
result, Hezbollah discarded the UN Charter. When the Open Letter was released,
Hezbollah’s identity was clandestine. Presently, however, and concomitant with its
commitment to pragmatism, Hezbollah openly expresses its commitment to the
International Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the UN Charter.254 The United
Nations is an organizational platform which Hezbollah may use to promulgate its norm of
resistance. One of the functions of the United Nations is to recognize and uphold
universal norms, such as sovereignty and the responsibility to protect. It is in the interest
of Hezbollah to construct the UN as a legitimate organization. Its commitment to the
UDHR and the UN Charter helps construct the Party of God as a legitimate political actor
not only in Lebanon, but in the region and in global politics. If it did not uphold the UN
Charter, Hezbollah would be further alienating itself from international society. If it
wishes to conquer Lebanon from the bottom up and continue constructing the norm of
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resistance, then Hezbollah must construct itself as legitimate political actor. If not,
Hezbollah would be reduced again to a clandestine militia, and like other militias from
the civil war, the pan-Shi’a party would be forcibly stripped of its weapons.
Unsurprisingly, Hezbollah asserts that Israel is in constant violation of the UDHR and the
UN Charter. In a form of norm contestation, Israel also constructs Hezbollah as a violator
of human rights. Hezbollah understands that identity and norms are critical in global
politics, and therefore, as a part of its policy of infitah and pragmatism, it was critical for
Hezbollah to abide by universal norms. The Party of God also willfully cooperates with
local and international aid agencies, such as the United Nations Development Program
(UNDP) and the United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF)
which were previously considered instruments of Western exploitation.255
Hezbollah’s continued campaign of anti-imperialism has become regional and is
manifested in its involvement in Syria. Hezbollah fighters cannot battle Israel and
simultaneously be involved in Syria. Consequently, it has concentrated its forces in Syria
where the situation is pressing. There, Nasrallah constructs Hezbollah as resisting an
imperial project orchestrated by Great and Little Satan and their imperial stooges, Saudi
Arabia and the Gulf states. According to Hezbollah, the GCC’s intervention in Yemen
entrenched Arab states for the first time as contemporary imperialists. To this end,
Hezbollah’s politico-ideological concept of anti-imperialism has shifted to include Arab
states. Again, the shifts in Hezbollah’s ideology are largely reflective of dynamic changes
in Hezbollah’s regional relations, such as the Syrian conflict and the Houthis’ attempt to
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oust President Hadi from power. The changes witnessed are examples of Hezbollah’s
ability to adapt and contribute to an ever-changing environment.
In sum, Hezbollah constructs itself as a pan-Islamic and pan-Arab movement
determined to challenge the dominance of Israel and the United States and their allies in
the region, including the GCC. Sayyed Qassem asserts that the “project of hegemony” led
by the United States is designed to subdue Lebanon and the region, enforce the
recognition of the “Zionist entity,” impose normalization of relations with the Zionists,
dilute our (Arab) identity and rich civilizations, conjoining our (Arab) fate with the
Western economies and industries, ensuring expropriation of our (Arab and Muslim)
nation’s wealth and resources, replacing heads of states and implementation of
programmes.256 Indeed, Lebanon and other Arab states remain targets of imperialism for
the exploitation of the region’s natural resources, such as water and oil.
Hezbollah has a legitimate claim that as long as the Shebaa Farms is occupied
then the norm of resistance must continuously be reconstructed. Today there are still
Lebanese detainees in Israeli prisons, there are virtually daily violations of Lebanese
airspace by Israeli drones, and the Shebaa Farms remains occupied.257 These are all
reasons why Hezbollah’s resistance must continuously be under construction. In essence,
as long Hezbollah is able to continually construct a reality of occupation and construct
Israel as the usurper of Arab lands and a threat to the region’s water supply then it will be
able to continue constructing its resistance norm. Hezbollah’s social construction of
occupation of the Shebaa Farms enables the Party of God to remain armed as a legitimate
resistance movement. Consequently, Hezbollah remains the most dominant political force
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in Lebanon. That being said, Hezbollah constructs the complete liberation of Arab lands,
including Palestine, Yemen, Syria, and Iraq as pivotal to its norm of resistance. This
ensures that the anti-imperial struggle is far from over. As Tripp explained in chapter 1,
where power goes, resistance must follow. The two are dialectically related. In all,
Hezbollah is a product of imperialism and Hezbollah needs imperialism.

Conclusion
Hezbollah is no longer directly resisting Israel, but instead claims to be resisting the
Israeli-American project of balkanizing the Middle East. The dichotomy of oppression
has also changed. The oppressors, often constructed to be the United States and Israel
remain unchanged, but Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states have recently been represented
as oppressors as a consequence of their involvement in Yemen. The oppressed are not
necessarily Lebanese, as was the case during Israel’s occupation of Lebanon, but the
Syrian and Yemeni people. The oppressed, therefore, have also changed. Again, the shift
in oppression is clearly a result of the changes in Hezbollah’s environment. As mentioned
above, Hezbollah has survived and will likely continue to survive due to its innate ability
to reconstruct itself and its ideology concomitantly with its changing environment.
The US, Israel, and Canada have listed Hezbollah as a terrorist organization. Hezbollah is
constructing Al Assad and the Yemeni people as the latest victims of an American-Israeli
plan to partition the Middle East into mini-protectorates. The idea of anti-imperialism
also shifted. The Party of God remains steadfast in constructing the United States and
Israel as manifestations of Satan (Great Satan and Little Satan) primarily due to their
imperial ambitions in the Middle East. In the 1985 Open Letter, Hezbollah proclaimed its
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refusal to recognize inter-governmental organizations (IGOs), but its tone swiftly
changed and came into line with Lebanonization and infitah. Hezbollah openly expresses
its commitment to the UDHR and the UN Charter and to working closely with aid
agencies. In chapter 4, Hezbollah’s norm of resistance is physically expressed in the 2006
war with Israel and the ongoing Syrian conflict.
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Chapter 4-The Physical Expression of Resistance

The Contestation of Norms in the 34-Day War
On July 12, 2006, Hezbollah fired rockets into northern Israel as a diversion. Next,
fighters of the Islamic Resistance crossed the “Blue Line” and entered Israel. (The Blue
Line is the demarcation along the border between northern Israel and southern Lebanon.)
The resistance fighters ambushed an Israeli patrol car in an uninhabited area of northern
Israel, killing three soldiers and arresting two others. The IDF was alerted that the Blue
Line had been violated and a rescue chase ensued into Lebanon where another five Israeli
soldiers were killed and a Merkava tank destroyed. Tactically, the operation was a
success.258 The operation illustrated how daring Hezbollah can be, but also exhibited the
group’s offensive abilities. Israel, too, wanted to illustrate its offensive capabilities and
did so with disproportionate force. Immediately following Hezbollah’s daring mission,
Israel imposed an air, land, and sea blockade effectively isolating Lebanon from the rest
of the world. Israel then began carpet bombing Lebanon’s infrastructure. A European
Union (EU) assessment revealed that in the South the “IDF destroyed or damaged1,489
buildings; 21 out of 29 bridges over the Litani River; 535 sections of road and 545
cultivated fields.”259 All of the runways of Beirut’s Rafiq El Hariri international airport
were bombed and six essential highways were damaged.260 Organizational platforms such
as Al-Manar TV and fifty-one publishing houses associated with Hezbollah were also
destroyed. Schools, universities, and other institutions of higher learning affiliated with
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2007), 135.
259
Alagha (b), 15.
260
Alagha (b), 15.
258

Elbenhawy 95

Hezbollah were also bombed.261 By destroying centers of learning, Israel is contesting the
construction of norms by attempting to disturb norm emergence in the norm lifecycle.
Israel’s blockade and the deployment of ground troops was not enough to curtail
Hezbollah’s resistance. To strengthen its ally, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards bypassed
Israel’s blockade and delivered hundreds of rockets to Hezbollah. Hezbollah’s norm of
resistance was manifested, as fighters fired 4,000 rockets into northern Israel over the
course of the war. Consequently, and as part of its campaign of psychological warfare,
Hezbollah effectively instilled fear into the Israeli psyche, forcing more than two million
to flee their homes to places of refuge and/or underground bunkers. In fact, according to a
BBC documentary, in 2006, Israel suffered the heaviest aerial offensive since its
inception in 1948.262 Despite this, Lebanon incurred more than $15 billion in damages
and lost revenues from tourism and sluggish economic activity.263 1,109 civilians lost
their lives and 4,339 were wounded. The official death toll for Hezbollah fighters cannot
be confirmed, but it is estimated by the number of funerals for fighters that approximately
184 fighters died as a result of the war.264
By kidnapping two Israeli soldiers, Sayyed Nasrallah was hoping to pressure
Israel into a prisoner exchange, hoping that all Lebanese resistance fighters left in Israeli
prisons would be released. Furthermore, Nasrallah stated that his decision to commit such
a bold act was partly done to express solidarity with the Palestinians in Gaza who were
attacked by the IDF on June 25, 2006.265 More importantly, however, Hezbollah
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committed a bold act to revive the norm of resistance which had lost power since May
2000. Hezbollah’s dangerous mission was also intended to revive other norms, such as
pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism. A bold action was required to regain respect from
supporters and allies and to reconstruct its norms and identity as the premier resistance
movement, national, regionally, and internationally.266 Alagha avers that “Hizbullah’s
identity and raison d’être as an Islamic jihadi movement warrants such a precept of
practice.”267 Nonetheless, Hezbollah never anticipated such a level of aggression from
Israel. Indeed, Nasrallah hinted that a similar operation was forthcoming on April 24,
2006, in an effort to secure the release of Samir Quntar, a senior member of the Islamic
Resistance, from Israeli prison. It is not the first time Hezbollah has kidnapped Israeli
soldiers. Colonel Elhanan Tennenbaum, for instance, was abducted in 2000 and only
released in 2004.268 If kidnapping is a customary occurrence, what made Israel react in
such a disproportionate manner in 2006? Similar to Hezbollah’s attempt to revive its
norms, Israel, too, attempted to maintain the status quo as the most powerful state in the
region. To do so, it must constantly reconstruct its identity and combat Hezbollah.
Israel’s unconditional withdrawal from Lebanon six years earlier hindered its identity as a
military power in the region and reversed its identity of “fighting Jew,”269 to a national
identity of vulnerability in a hostile environment.270 An alien entity in the Middle East,
Israel sought to reconstruct its identity and re-establish itself as a military force in the
region by swiftly defeating the only enemy that has forced it to withdraw from occupied
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territory without a land-for-peace deal. Thus, it was critical for its identity construction to
illustrate its military might and forcibly disarm the Party of God. The Israeli-Lebanese
war was not only a contestation of norms, but also a contestation of identities.
Israel constructed Hezbollah as terrorists attempting to provoke and terrorize
Israelis by kidnapping two of its soldiers in a pre-emptive attack. Both, however, cannot
construct the Other or contest each other’s norms without having meaningful interaction.
In this case, it is warfare that is the meaningful interaction. In response to “terrorism,” the
2006 war was the most destructive war Israel has waged against Hezbollah and Lebanon
since first invading the country in 1978. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert understood that it
was his last chance to destroy Hezbollah and reconstruct Israel’s identity as fighter of
terror. Hezbollah provided this pretext by acting first. In September 2006, Prime Minister
Olmert ordered an “objective” investigation into the war to review any wrongdoings,
known as the Winograd Commission. Olmert’s testimony during the Winograd
Commission revealed that his administration had been planning to go to war with
Hezbollah as early as March 2006, four months before the war actually took place.271
Israel constructed the war as being provoked, but instead Israel’s goal was to exterminate
Hezbollah by any means necessary. By constructing Hezbollah as terrorists, Israel is
absolving itself from any wrongdoing. Thus, basic norms such as human rights or
sovereignty can be violated in the name of combating terrorism. For Israel, the war was
constructed as fighting terrorism and bringing home Israel’s “children,” but Olmert’s
revelation and Israel’s disproportionate response, illustrates that Israel was seeking to
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contest Hezbollah’s norm of resistance physically. Israel constructs its own norm of
resistance, which is resisting Hezbollah’s terrorism.
Hezbollah constructed the war as a battle between the oppressed and oppressors
and between the Muslim umma and the “‘Zionist invaders,’” the “‘corrupters of the land
and the killers of the prophets’.”272 By doing so, Hezbollah validated the use of lesser
jihad and martyrdom in order to defend the umma which is under attack. Again,
Hezbollah was attempting to construct itself as defender of the umma against invaders,
but also to garner support for its cause from Muslims across the world. It was through
intersubjective meanings that Hezbollah constructed the Other. If Hezbollah constructs
Israel as Zionist invaders, Hezbollah’s reconstruction of jihad, martyrdom, oppression,
and anti-imperialism have helped reconstruct Hezbollah’s norm of resistance. However,
its policies of Lebanonization and infitah and its position in the Lebanese government
have elevated the Party of God from a clandestine movement to legitimate political party.
By extension, Hezbollah is now able to exchange the “terrorist” charge with Israel, in a
form of norm contestation. The label of terrorist is constructed by those who exercise
disproportionate political power, not by those who are subjected to it. Hezbollah’s use of
terrorism is illustrative of its renewed political power that is reinforced by its arsenal of
weapons. Throughout the war, Israel and Hezbollah accused the other of terrorism.
Hezbollah constructed Israel as an aggressor who violates basic norms, targeting civilians
and infrastructure, while exploiting the use of American-made cluster bombs to attack the
enemy. By attacking Lebanese infrastructure, even in Christian neighbourhoods, and
attacking Hezbollah’s bastions, Israel was attempting to systematically deconstruct
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Hezbollah’s legitimacy. By bombing Shi’a and Christian neighbourhoods and state
infrastructure, Israel was to attempting to rally supporters and detractors of the movement
to rebel against Hezbollah’s raison d'être. It is similar to Hezbollah’s tactic of utilizing
psychological warfare to terrorize and provoke the IDF into unilaterally withdrawing
from Lebanon. Israel, too, is attempting to terrorize the Lebanese citizenry by sowing
discord between the citizenry and the Islamic Resistance. The contestation of norms are
not only characterized by competing ideas, but are also manifested on the battlefield.
Despite Israel’s response, the international community, including the United
States and Canada, was firmly behind Olmert. In an attempt to strictly police Hezbollah,
the status quo powers in the region, such as Egypt, Jordan, and the GCC states also
voiced their opposition to what was constructed as a provocation.273 However, Nasrallah
made a “‘Faithful Promise” in 2001: ‘“We are people who don't leave our prisoners
behind’.” Therefore, once the opportunity presented itself, Nasrallah seized it.274 On
August 5, 2006, in an attempt to resolve the crisis, former Prime Minister Fouad Siniora
proposed the Seven Point Plan. Siniora’s plan called for the deployment of 15,000
Lebanese troops to monitor the Blue Line between Israel and Lebanon. The Lebanese
Cabinet unanimously accepted Siniora’s plan. Historically, the party consistently vetoed
any proposal involving the deployment of Lebanese troops along the southern border.
Hezbollah argued that the army’s presence along the border only served to protect Israel
from rocket attacks fired by the Islamic Resistance.275
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The war finally concluded with the implementation of United Nations Security
Council Resolution 1701 on August 11, 2006. UNSC Resolution 1701, among other
things, called for a cessation of violence and for a UNIFIL force of up to 15,000 soldiers
to be deployed to the Blue Line. One of Israel’s objectives for going to war was to
forcibly implement UNSC Resolution 1559 (September 2, 2004), which, among other
things, called for Hezbollah to disarm. During the Cabinet meeting two of Hezbollah’s
ministers voted ‘yes’ for UNSC Resolution 1559 and UNSC Resolution 1701. One of
Hezbollah’s goals was to survive the war and remain intact. Nasrallah argued that
Hezbollah’s acceptance of Lebanese troops to be deployed to the south, as previously
demanded by Israel, and its acceptance of UNSC Resolution 1701 ‘“serves the national
interest since the strength of Lebanon is in its resistance and national unity’.”276 This
position is reflective of Hezbollah’s policies of Lebanonization and infitah.277 Hezbollah
is reconstructing itself as a pragmatic political party that is seeking to serve the interests
of the state over its own.
Hezbollah constructed Israel as the aggressor, contending that as long as the
Shebaa Farms remains occupied, resistance fighters remain in Israeli jails, and Israel
withholds the landmines maps, then the resistance must continue and the Party of God
will remain armed.278 For Hezbollah, the provocateur in the war was Israel. Hezbollah
stresses that Israel’s war was planned in advance. Nevertheless, Israel and Hezbollah
miscalculated each other’s capabilities and Nasrallah confirmed that if he had understood
the magnitude of Israel’s response, Hezbollah would have not committed such a bold
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act.279 Nonetheless, the Party of God constructed the war as a “Divine Victory” for the
Resistance, emphasizing the victory not only for Hezbollah, but also the Muslim umma.
Nasrallah stated that the conflict “‘surpass[ed] Lebanon . . . it [was] the conflict of the
umma’.” Hezbollah’s Divine Victory provided a new lease on life for its norm
construction. Its resilience and its will to survive Israeli bellicosity helped revive
Hezbollah’s norm of resistance which had been losing power since Israel withdrew its
forces in May 2000. Its resistance appealed to the Palestinians, while the party’s
popularity exploded in the West Bank and Gaza and across the region. Hezbollah resymbolized resistance in the region.280 The 2006 war disseminated Hezbollah’s norm of
resistance across the Middle East. Its willingness to accept Siniora’s Seven Point Plan
and UNSC Resolution 1701 reflects the party’s commitment to its policies of infitah,
integration and Lebanonization.281 Ultimately, Israel failed to achieve its objective of
disarming Hezbollah and subsequently eradicating the party’s norm of resistance. The
majority of Lebanon (87% of Lebanese, including 89% Sunni and 80% Christian)282
favoured Hezbollah’s response to the Israeli aggression. The contestation of norms
between Hezbollah and Israel proved beneficial to Hezbollah’s resistance. The Party of
God emerged intact and armed with increased normative ammunition. Despite Israeli
efforts, Hezbollah’s reconstruction of resistance, if anything, was strengthened by the
war. Once again, Hezbollah rekindled and re-symbolized resistance in the Middle East.

Alagha (b), 3.
Rola El Husseini, “Hezbollah and the Axis of Refusal: Hamas, Iran
and Syria,” Third World Quarterly 31, no.5 (2010), 809.
281
Alagha (b), 6.
282
El Husseini, 808.
279
280

Elbenhawy 102

Rescuing the Resistance Bloc from the Syrian Crisis
Anti-government protests began in the southern city of Deraa, Syria in March 2011.283
The ripple effect of the so-called Arab Spring had reached Syria as it had reached Tunisia
and Egypt before it. The protests swiftly gained momentum and within a few months the
protests were widespread and violent. Nasrallah stood by the protesters in Tunisia and
Egypt, voicing his support for the will of the people. However, once the protests reached
Syria, Nasrallah quickly changed his message and summarily condemned the protests.
The Party of God began constructing the conflict as an imperial project, engineered by
the United States and its allies in the region. Nasrallah accused Saudi Arabia of waging
proxy wars across the Middle East, including in Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria by
materially and militarily supporting armed Islamist movements.284 Currently, Saudi
Arabia’s “proxy” war has manifested itself in Yemen, which is actively being bombed by
the GCC, led by Saudi Arabia. No longer was Hezbollah’s norm construction directed
solely at Israel, but now at the “imperial project” designed to remove Al Assad from
power. Hezbollah constructed Israel, Turkey, and the GCC states as principal culprits in
the imperial project.285 As early as May 2011, Hezbollah pledged its unwavering support
for Al Assad.286
The geo-political relationship between Hezbollah and Syria is based upon mutual
identities and norms. Following several failed attempts to reclaim the Golan Heights, Al
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Assad closely aligned Syria with Iran and Hezbollah. “For strategic and ideological
motives, Syria is more pro-Hizballah than Hizballah is pro-Syria.”287 By aligning itself
with Hezbollah, Syria hoped to remain relevant in the regional order of the Middle East
and reclaim its spot as a regional player, especially following Hezbollah’s Divine Victory
in 2006.288 Hezbollah receives substantial ammunition from Iran, while Syria serves as
the conduit between the two parties, helping to deliver weapon shipments to Lebanon.
What defines their relationship is not Shi’ism. Rather, what defines their relationship is
the norm of resistance. Another member of the bloc is HAMAS. However, military
cooperation with HAMAS ceased, its funds were reduced, and HAMAS was temporarily
removed from the resistance bloc for its opposition to Al Assad and its support and
alleged training of opposition fighters in Syria.289
Similar to Hezbollah, the resistance bloc resists oppression, anti-imperialism, and
Zionism. By extension, Iran and Hezbollah’s eagerness to bolster Al Assad in Syria’s
protracted conflict is not an attempt to further sow sectarian discord in the region, but
rather to rescue the resistance bloc which is categorically at risk if Al Assad is removed
from power. Syria remains one of the few Arab states in the region allied with Iran. As
norm entrepreneurs, Iran and Hezbollah must ensure that Al Assad remains in power, at
least for the time being, if the resistance bloc wishes to continuously reconstruct the norm
of resistance and continue challenging the status quo powers. The conflict is not only a
crisis for Syria, but also for Iran and Hezbollah.

Emile El-Hokayem, “Hizballah and Syria: Outgrowing the Proxy Relationship,” The
Washington Quarterly 30, no. 2 (2007): 36.
288
El-Hokayem, 35.
289
Sullivan, 25.
287

Elbenhawy 104

Hezbollah’s reconstruction of the enemy has changed. Since its inception, its
norm of resistance has been directed at Israel. Following Israel’s withdrawal in 2000 and
Hezbollah’s Divine Victory in 2006, the party has struggled to construct a threat which
would require its norm of resistance.290 Syria’s conflict provided this pretext and the
Syrian government and Hezbollah began constructing the Syrian opposition as
“terrorists” and takfiris. Only those in positions of power with relative legitimacy can
accuse the Other of being a terrorist. The idea that Hezbollah is able to deploy the label of
terrorism as a political tool, attests to its empowerment and position as being part of the
Lebanese established order. With the addition of IS and al-Nusra Front forming another
element of the Syrian opposition, Hezbollah’s construction of the enemy as being
“terrorist” has gained some legitimacy. Hezbollah has compared the Free Syrian Army
(FSA), one of the principal opposition groups to Al Assad, to the defunct South Lebanese
Army (SLA), averring that that they have collaborated and conspired with the “enemy”
against the Syrian state.291
Nasrallah constructed Hezbollah’s intervention in the Syrian conflict as a
necessity, invoking the party’s Divine Victory in 2006, promising that the same would
happen in Syria.292 The Syrian government welcomed the intervention, as Al Assad
needed to bolster his offensive against the opposition which had been constructed as
“armed gangs.”293 In line with its policy of Lebanonization, Hezbollah constructed its
involvement as a defensive measure to protect Lebanon’s eastern border with Syria. The
Party of God also argued that it was entering the war to offer refuge to those Lebanese
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citizens, who are mostly Shi’a, who reside in Syria. Hezbollah also argued that it had to
enter Syria’s conflict in order to protect Shi’a holy sites, such as the Sayyida Zeineb
shrine from being desecrated by takfiris. Not coincidentally, the Sayyida Zeineb mosque
is strategically located in southeastern Damascus.294 Most Hezbollah attacks in and
around Damascus originated from the location of Sayyida Zeineb.295
Hezbollah’s objectives in Syria are twofold: 1.) Hezbollah seeks to rescue Al
Assad from being removed from power; and 2.) Hezbollah hopes to continue receiving
material support from Iran and Syria by regaining access to its support lines connecting
Damascus to Beirut. Support lines connecting the two capitals were overrun by rebels.
Hezbollah’s resistance depends upon these routes to carry weapons and other
ammunitions which help construct the party’s norm of resistance.296 In a speech delivered
on May 25, 2013, Nasrallah lucidly explained why Hezbollah’s involvement in Syria is
necessary: ‘“Syria is the rear guard of the resistance, its backbone, and the resistance
cannot stay with its arms folded when its rear guard is exposed’.”297 Nasrallah continued
by stating that Hezbollah is entering a new phase in the war: ‘“the phase of fortifying the
resistance and protecting its backbone’.”298
Hezbollah has confined itself mostly to Al Qalamoun Mountains and Damascus.
Strategically, it has stationed all of its fighters on the western side of the Syrian-Lebanese
border. Hezbollah has no active military presence in the north or northeast Syria, where
IS has a strong presence. Hezbollah’s involvement was immediately felt on the
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battlefield, scoring a string of victories in rebel-held territories in central Syria, and
proving to be an asset to Al Assad, who, up to 2013, was slowly losing his grip on power.
The Islamic Resistance has operated openly with Syrian armed forces, Iraqi fighters, progovernment militias, and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps.299
To date, Al Qusayr represents Hezbollah’s “Divine Victory” in Syria since its
intervention in 2013. Al Qusayr is a small town in Homs governorate which, until 2013,
had been held by rebel forces. The besieged town served as a smuggling route for rebels,
importing arms, ammunition, and fighters. Some of the fighters smuggled into Al Qusayr
were Lebanese nationals. Thus, recapturing Al Qusayr was as important to Al Assad, as it
was to Hezbollah, especially since it borders Lebanon. Protecting the border with
Lebanon and its Shi’a villages in Syria is one of Hezbollah’s stated objectives.300 The
battle of Al Qusayr, led by Hezbollah, inflicted maximum psychological damage on the
rebels who also suffered heavy losses. It was a significant victory for Al Assad, whose
forces, in 2012, attempted to regain the town, but were unable to completely recapture it.
According to Sullivan, Hezbollah fighters are often better trained, disciplined in jihad,
and experienced than their allies in the war.301 However, this is the first conflict in which
the Islamic Resistance is using military style equipment, such as tanks. The Party of God
has assisted the Syrian forces in Halab, Homs, Deraa, Damascus, and has conducted
“anti-insurgency” operations in Al-Qalamoun Mountains.302 Hezbollah also offers light
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infantry, conducts reconnaissance missions, and undertakes sniper fire. Hezbollah also
trains Syrian soldiers and provides reinforcements to regime forces.303
The war has taken its toll on Hezbollah’s fighters and on its identity construction.
In a 2014 interview with Assafir, Nasrallah admitted that the war has been a “doubleedged sword;” on one side the Islamic Resistance has gained valuable experience in
military theatres, and the other Hezbollah’s credibility as a resistance movement has been
tarnished in the Arab world,304 especially in Sunni states. The gains made from the 2006
war have been sacrificed by its engagement in Syria which has proven to be divisive.
Consequently, Hezbollah’s legitimacy is at risk if it chooses to continue its involvement
in Syria. It is worth noting that the majority of Lebanon’s Shi’a, which make up
Hezbollah’s rank-and-file, favour the party’s involvement in Syria. This initially was not
the case. Incidents of car bombings in 2014, in Beirut’s suburb of Haret Hreik, a
Hezbollah stronghold, give legitimacy to Nasrallah’s claims that if Hezbollah does not
take the fight to Syria, the fight will come to Lebanon. This has helped to construct the
takfiris as an existential threat, similar to how the Zionists are a threat to Hezbollah.305
The question worth asking is: would takfiris be a threat to Lebanon if Hezbollah did not
intervene in Syria? The question is especially relevant, when examining the series of car
bombings which have occurred in southern Beirut since the start of its military campaign
in Syria. Official figures of Hezbollah fighters or Iranian Revolutionary Guards
“martyred” in Syria cannot be confirmed, but funerals held in Lebanon provide an
indication of how many have died so far. According to reports, approximately 1,263
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to1,280 “martyrs” had died as of October 2015.306 On December 15, 2015, Israel
estimated the death toll to be estimated around 1,300 to 1,500 and the number of injured
to be 5,000. When numbers are tallied they reveal that a third of all Hezbollah fighters are
either dead or injured as a result of Hezbollah’s involvement in the war. In the hope of
rescuing the “backbone” of the resistance bloc, Hezbollah is willing to sacrifice its norm
of resistance and its fighters.
As a result of its controversial involvement in Syria, Hezbollah’s resistance bloc
has also been adversely affected. The majority of Palestinian movements, including
HAMAS, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), and Jihadi Salafis vehemently
oppose the Al Assad regime. For example, on December 4, 2012, Ansar Allah, a
Palestinian jihadi salafi movement, distanced itself from Hezbollah and sent “would-be
martyrs” to battle government forces. Constant clashes with HAMAS, the PLO, the
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), and the
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) are indications of cooling
relations between Hezbollah and its allies in Palestine. 307 During the siege of Al Qusayr,
Hezbollah fighters suspected that HAMAS had provided training to rebel fighters. Many
of the rebel’s defensive tactics used in the battle were familiar tactics used by HAMAS,
which HAMAS itself adopted from Hezbollah. Despite HAMAS being a part of the
resistance bloc, in May 2013, Iran subsequently slashed a portion of its funding (15
million pounds) in response to HAMAS’ aid and material support of rebel forces in
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Syria.308 Thus, a dilemma has ensued: Hezbollah and Iran are attempting to rescue the
resistance bloc, but risk alienating HAMAS and other Palestinian factions that hope to
topple Al Assad’s regime. The resistance bloc will be affected, and consequently,
Hezbollah’s norm of resistance and identity construction as the defender of the umma
(defensive jihad) and of Jerusalem is in jeopardy, especially across the Sunni world.
Quantum Communications and Sofres Liban polling agency conducted two
surveys across Lebanon between the months of February and May 2014. Respondents
were asked one question: “Are you for Hezbollah’s intervention in Syria?”309 The sample
population used was 1,500 across all demographics. Overall, 56% of respondents oppose
Hezbollah’s intervention in Syria. Twenty-eight percent of respondents support
Hezbollah’s involvement. In regards to the party’s constituency, 61% of Shi’as support
the party’s intervention. In the first round of polling, 22% of Shi’as opposed the party’s
intervention, but that number increased in March to 25%. Southern Lebanon was more
inclined to favour intervention (71%) than the Beqaa (44%), another Hezbollah
stronghold. In the first round, 82% of the Sunni demographic opposed Hezbollah’s
decision to enter the war, while the Christians and the Druze also opposed the war, 61%
and 63% respectively. In the second round, 86% of Sunnis disapproved, 53% of
Christians, and 64% of Druze also disagreed with Hezbollah’s war in Syria.310
Hezbollah’s intervention in Syria was never a popular decision, even among its own
constituents, but the party has constructed its involvement in Syria as a mechanism of
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deterrence against a threat posed by the status quo powers and takfiris that will eventually
reach Lebanon. Nasrallah contends that “only stupid people wouldn’t” defend
themselves.311 In a speech in 2013, Nasrallah enjoined that takfiris were a threat to all
Muslims, Sunni or Shi’a. For Hezbollah, it is the norm of resistance which is at risk.
Nasrallah has constructed the conflict in non-sectarian terms: “The dispute in Syria is
between two sides, two axes, two projects, it is not between Sunnis and Shia[s], it is not
between sects.”312
Being a member of the resistance bloc has complicated Hezbollah’s norm
construction. It is also apparent that Hezbollah is facing difficulties in constructing the
norm of pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism or state sovereignty. Hezbollah’s intervention in
Syria has compromised its norm of resistance and has undermined its dichotomy of
oppression. By involving itself in the war, Hezbollah has assisted in fomenting sectarian
discord in the region, categorically undermining its norm of pan-Islamism and
“buttressing the state sovereignty of the regime.”313 Hezbollah has placed itself in a
difficult position with no end in sight. By entering the war, Hezbollah has done little to
stop the war or reduce the number of deaths as a result of the conflict. The perception is
that Hezbollah is no longer a symbol of resistance in the region, but rather shifted from
resistance to being a puppet of the Al Assad regime. For many, resistance is defined as
challenging tyranny and oppression. Hezbollah is reconstructing resistance as means of
rescuing a dictatorship from an American-Israeli plot to dismantle Syria. The wide appeal
Hezbollah enjoyed in 2006 has since waned due to its alternative definition of resistance.
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Despite Hezbollah fatalities, Nasrallah reaffirmed in November 2013 that
Hezbollah would stay in Syria “‘as long as the reasons [to fight in Syria] remain’.”314
Indeed, the resistance bloc has proved to be an asset to regime forces. Al Assad began
2014 in a stronger position than the previous year because of battles won in Damascus
and Qalamoun in March 2014 which have helped to solidify the regime’s control of the
strip stretching from Damascus to Homs and coastal cities. 315 It seems that sacrificing its
norm construction, its alliance with Sunni and Palestinian factions across the Middle
East, its symbolism as a resistance movement, and over a 1000 “martyrs” is worth it as
long as Syria remains intact. Hezbollah has continued reconstructing its norm of
resistance through the social structure of the Syrian war, but its involvement has
ultimately damaged its legitimacy as the voice of the downtrodden.

Conclusion

Ideas matter when they are exercised socially. However, ideas may have strong appeal,
but are not realized or exercised until circumstances permit. Martyrdom in Islam, for
example, remains a significant idea even if it is not materially expressed by every
Muslim. For the continuous reconstruction of resistance, it is imperative for Hezbollah to
construct an enemy, such as Israel, the United States, takfiris, Turkey, and the GCC. By
constructing an enemy, the Party of God is justifying its physical resistance. In
Hezbollah’s war with Israel in 2006, it constructed the war as retaliation for past
314
315
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aggressions and land still occupied by the “Zionists.” In Syria, the Party of God is
attempting to rescue Al Assad from being toppled. In both wars, there have been
numerous martyrs willing to sacrifice themselves for what is constructed as a legitimate
cause. Hezbollah’s involvement in Syria and its support of the regime have adversely
affected its legitimacy in the Arab world, sacrificing its norms and identity construction,
while alienating its Sunni allies, such as HAMAS. By alienating HAMAS and other
Palestinian factions, Hezbollah is alienating the Palestinians in Gaza. In doing so, it
undermines the continuous construction of Hezbollah as a defender of Jerusalem and a
staunch advocate for the Palestinian cause. Hezbollah’s popularity in Palestine has
dwindled since 2006, primarily due to its military involvement in Syria. By involving
itself in Syria, Hezbollah has helped foment sectarian tensions in the region, sacrificing
its norms of pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism. Consequently, legitimacy gained by
resisting Israeli bellicosity in 2006 has been sacrificed to rescue Syria from a plot
engineered by the United States, Israel, IS, the GCC states, among others, to attack Syria
first and once their objectives have been achieved Hezbollah will be next. 316 In 2006,
Hezbollah managed to reconstruct and re-kindle its norm of resistance successfully, and
as a result, its popularity soared across the Middle East. However, the Syrian crisis has
only alienated Hezbollah from its Sunni allies, and more importantly from the Sunni
community in Lebanon with many of its fighters returning in coffins, it does not seem
long before the party must re-evaluate its involvement in the Syrian conflict. Syria’s
conflict challenges the party’s legitimacy as a political party. For the first time it seems
contradictory that Hezbollah would be a member of the Lebanese cabinet and be military
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involved in a war. It is because resistance is constructed to be a defensive measure
manifested in defensive jihad. Hezbollah’s involvement is not defensive, but rather preemptive under the pretext of deterrence. This calls into question Hezbollah’s credibility
as a resistance movement and its idea of anti-imperialism. Syria’s war is causing
Hezbollah’s norm of resistance to conflict with its other norms. There is a contradiction
between Hezbollah managing its policy of Lebanonization and politicization and its
regional military involvements. Both cannot be realized without risking the movement’s
norm construction and legitimacy.
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Chapter 5-Conclusion
I have analyzed Hezbollah as a norm entrepreneur in the Middle East. My research
question was: how does Hezbollah function as a norm entrepreneur in the Middle East?
Phrased differently, how does Hezbollah create the norm of resistance? The Party of God
constructs and reconstructs its norm of resistance through institutionalized ideas. Ideas
are then physically expressed. Ideas analyzed included jihad, martyrdom, the
oppressed/oppressor dichotomy, and anti-imperialism. The party physically expressed its
norm of resistance during the Hezbollah-Israel war in 2006 and currently in Syria where
the party is battling what it has constructed as takfiris or “terrorists,” also known as the
Syrian opposition. Hezbollah’s ability to construct its enemies as terrorists attests to its
power and position as a part of the Lebanese established order.
I used social constructivism to examine Hezbollah as a norm entrepreneur. It
helps fill the lacuna in the corpus already published on Hezbollah. Most published works
on Hezbollah are neoliberal because of how broad and encompassing neoliberalism is, in
contrast to neorealism’s narrow and state-centric analysis of global politics.
Neoliberalism and social constructivism recognize non-state actors in global politics, but
constructivism’s ontology analyzes ideas, norms, and identity, which are pertinent to my
study on Hezbollah. The construction of ideas, norms, and identity have been ignored in
mainstream analyses of Hezbollah.
It is difficult to discuss the regional order of the Middle East without examining
Hezbollah. It has proved to be, if anything, the most powerful political force in Lebanon
and a critical member of the resistance bloc. To adapt to its ever-changing environment,
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Hezbollah had to reconstruct its identity and emphasize its commitment to infitah,
Lebanonization, and pragmatism. It has managed to reconstruct its clandestine identity
and become a mainstream political actor. Its ability to adapt to a dynamic environment is
one of the reasons it has survived more than thirty years. Despite its changes, its
resistance to Israel and the United States has remained largely unchanged. By the same
token, its norm of resistance has shifted several times over the course of its history. The
party has signaled a shift in its norm of Islamism, from moqawama Islamiyya (Islamic
resistance) to moqawama Lebananiyya (Lebanese resistance). Shifts in Hezbollah’s
ideology can be attributed to Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon, which shifted the norm
of resistance from a regional or external struggle for independence to an internal one,
seeking more political power. It can also be explained by its desire to attain greater
legitimacy by pursuing the bottom-up approach and conquering Lebanon through the
ballot box rather than by force.
Introduced in 1991, Hezbollah’s policies of infitah and Lebanonization have been
instrumental in shaping and evolving Hezbollah’s norm of resistance. Simultaneously,
Hezbollah contends that its pan-Shi’a identity is in line with Lebanonization and that one
does not contradict the other.317 As a norm entrepreneur, the policies of infitah and
Lebanonization signaled a change in the party’s norm of resistance. If the party remained
steadfast in its ideology and resistant to change then the Party of God would have been
unable to adapt and remained a militia. One of its true successes is the party’s ability to
maintain a regional alliance with Syria and Iran, while simultaneously appealing to
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voters. Hezbollah eventually became a member of the cabinet, reserving the right to veto
legislation. Being able to evolve and implement change is critical and remains an integral
element of the party’s continued success.
Hezbollah exercised Greater Jihad from 2001 to 2006. In 2006, Hezbollah
engaged in Lesser Jihad during its war with Israel. In 2008, Hezbollah’s resistance
shifted to the domestic sphere, taking the form of protests against the Siniora
government. From 2009 on, Hezbollah practiced Greater Jihad in the domestic sphere. In
2011, Hezbollah’s constructed the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt as legitimate
revolutions seeking to uproot tyranny and corruption. However, once protests began in
Syria, Hezbollah’s support shifted from the people to the government. Once it involved
itself in Syria, Hezbollah shifted its resistance construction, from domestic to regional.
Hezbollah has engaged in Lesser Jihad in an effort to protect its borders with Syria,
rescue the resistance bloc, and disrupt what it constructs as a U.S.-Israeli engineered
project to dismantle Syria and then attack Hezbollah.
Hezbollah’s normative idea of martyrdom also shifted. The most important
change was in the typology of martyrdom. Al-istishhadi al-mujahid has been replaced
with al-shahid al-mujahid as the appropriate method of warfare. Hezbollah’s principal
enemy is no longer Israel, but now includes “terrorists” or takfiris. Hezbollah’s ability to
label the Other as terrorist or takfiri is illustrative of its power as a part of the Lebanese
established order. This power manifested itself in the 2006 war which comprised a
contestation of norms between Israel and Hezbollah. The GCC has also become a
principal enemy because of its support of the Syrian opposition and its current military
campaign in Yemen. For the first time, Hezbollah’s construction of anti-imperialism
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includes Arab states. Initially, the social construction of sacrifice was constructed as an
act of religious conviction. From 1985 to 1991, Hezbollah, emphasized that the act of
self-sacrifice would be rewarded with paradise. The social construction of Imam
Hussein’s role in the Karbala Drama was used by Hezbollah to religiously sanction the
act of martyrdom or self-sacrifice. From 1992 on, Hezbollah applied infitah and
Lebanonization to martyrdom, constructing it as a national duty to preserve the nation’s
borders, integrity, and dignity (‘izzat wa karamat al umma). Similar to jihad, martyrdom
remains an integral element in Hezbollah’s ideology and norm entrepreneurship.
The Party of God has continued to construct the umma as oppressed. Currently,
Hezbollah constructs the Syrian, Palestinian, and Yemeni people as oppressed. Hezbollah
has constructed the status quo powers as the oppressors, including the GCC, Turkey,
Israel, and the United States. Israel remains the embodiment of oppression. The
dichotomy of oppression has provided the necessary pretext for Hezbollah’s norm of
resistance. As the voice of the downtrodden, the Party of God must resist what it has
constructed as oppression by the powerful. Again, where there is power, there is
resistance. Hezbollah continues to resist the continued occupation of the Shebaa Farms
which Syria, Lebanon, and Hezbollah claim to be Lebanese territory. Israel’s continued
occupation of the Shebaa Farms provides the legitimacy needed for Hezbollah’s
construction of resistance. Hezbollah’s idea of anti-imperialism has changed from
resisting the Israeli occupation of Lebanon to resisting what it has constructed as a U.S.Israeli project designed to balkanize the Middle East.
The norm of resistance reached its peak following Hezbollah’s so-called Divine
Victory in 2006. On 25 May 2013, Hezbollah officially announced its military
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involvement in Syria in an effort to rescue the resistance bloc, protect Shi’a shrines, deter
“terrorists” from committing an attack on Lebanon, and protect Lebanese citizens in
Syria. Syria has proved to be a divisive issue in Lebanon, with the 56% of Lebanese
opposing the party’s intervention. As a result, and with swiftness, its norm of resistance
has begun to wane. The momentum gained by its Divine Victory in 2006 is lost and it has
alienated itself from its Sunni allies, including HAMAS. Syria’s conflict has undermined
Hezbollah’s norm construction and has contradicted its dichotomy of oppression. By
involving itself in the war, Hezbollah is fueling sectarian discord in the region and
undermining its norms of pan-Islamism and pan-Arabism. The rescue mission has proved
to be a costly endeavour for the resistance bloc, with Hezbollah carrying much of the
burden.
Future research trajectories may examine how the continued occupation of the
Shebaa Farms has impacted Hezbollah’s norm of resistance. Other areas of future
research may analyze Hezbollah’s norm construction and how the Syrian war has caused
the norm of resistance to conflict with other norms, such as the norm of pan-Islamism and
pan-Arabism. The norm of pan-Islamism invokes the unity of the Muslim umma, whereas
the norm of pan-Arabism advocates for the unity of Arabs. Another future research
trajectory may analyze Hezbollah’s construction of the enemy. Hezbollah has historically
constructed the enemy to be Israel or the United States, however, Hezbollah has recently
constructed new enemies, such as the GCC states and Sunni extremism. How does
Hezbollah construct new enemies and why? How does it affect its norm of resistance?
Future research is required on Hezbollah’s continued involvement in Syria. By battling
on the side of the Syrian regime, how does Hezbollah’s continued involvement in Syria
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contradict its norm of resistance? As a norm entrepreneur, how will Hezbollah strengthen
its norm of resistance which has waned since 2013? More importantly, are norms being
redefined by other groups? That is, are other groups successfully redefining resistance
better than Hezbollah? Are other ideas or norms supplanting the idea of resistance, such
as democratization? Does Israel remain the principal enemy in the region or has it been
replaced with resisting domestic governance and corruption in the Arab world? An
example of resistance to domestic governance was the Arab Spring uprisings in 2011.
Another example may include resistance to the Lebanese confessional system which is
constructed as being outdated.
Hezbollah’s policies of infitah, Lebanonization, and pragmatism have proved to
be critical to the party’s success as a norm entrepreneur. Through the implementation of
these policies, the Party of God has been able to construct and reconstruct its normative
ideology. All three ideas are indispensable to Hezbollah and will continue to be
reconstructed according to the party’s political environment. However, its victories in the
Lebanese political arena and on the battlefield are at risk and if more fighters continue to
return in coffins Hezbollah may have to rethink its commitments to the resistance bloc,
but more importantly to its constituency, which has helped to legitimize the party. The
party needs to regain the trust of its constituents and unify its rank-and-file which has
suffered a schism over the Syrian crisis. The construction and realization of ideas will
only be successful if they are perceived as legitimate. Without the perception of being
legitimate, the Party of God is reduced to being a militia once again. Without legitimacy
and political support, Hezbollah will be perceived as a terrorist organization. Something
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the party has always challenged and detested. Indeed, the Syrian conflict is the
Resistance’s Achilles heel.
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